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Crocette: Hybrid Sex and Age Discrimination

COMMENT

CONSIDERING HYBRID SEX AND
AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS BY
WOMEN: EXAMINING
APPROACHES TO PLEADING AND
ANALYSIS - A PRAGMATIC MODEL
1. INTRODUCTION
Many mid-life to older women face employment discrimination that does not fit easily into already existing categories under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("the
ADEA") , or the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") because
the discrimination often involves a fusion of both age and sex.l
The discrimination cases brought by older women on the basis
of age and sex, however, are scarcely consIdered by lawyers or
courts as a single cause of action concerning the combination of
sex-and-age bias. 2 A recent study prepared by the Women's
Legal Defense Fund ("WLDF Study") involved 335 cases alleging age and sex discrimination that spanned two decades and
reported that women were the overwhelming majority of litigants in those cases.3 Yet in only ten percent of the opinions

1. 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (1994).

2. See HELEN NORTON, et al, EMPWYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MIn-LIFE
AND OLDER WOMEN: How COURTS TREAT SEX-ANn-AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES [hereinafter "WLDF STUDV") (AARP, 1996). See id. at 2, 3,15.
3. See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2 at 2, 3. The WLDF STUDY examined all published and unpublished state and federal court opinions on cases involving sex and age
discrimination claims between January I, 1976 and September 30, 1995, for a total of
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reviewed were the age and sex discrimination claims evaluated
as combined discrimination.4
One might therefore speculate that the problem of combined
discrimination against older women as "older women" is slight,
or has gone virtually unnoticed. However, a steadily increasing
body of discourse has considered and found support for the
proposition that older women face employment and societal
discrimination that is separate and distinct from that of older
men and younger women.5 The WLDF Study points to a long335 cases. See id. at 2. The WLDF STUDY did not include jury verdicts that were unaccompanied by a written decision, or out-of-court settlements. See id. at 1. Of the total
cases reviewed, eighty-one percent of the claims were made by women, while sixteen
percent involved male plaintiffs. See id. at 3. All other cases involved class actions or
multiple plaintiffs of both sexes. See id. at 3.
4. See id. at 2, 15.
5. See generally, FRANCINE WEISS, OLDER WOMEN AND JOB DISCRIMINATION: A
PRIMER (Older Women's League 1985), FRANCINE WEISS, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST OLDER WOMEN: A HANDBOOK ON LITIGATING AGE & SEX DIBCRIMINATION CASES (Older Women's League 1989); Howard C. Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Empluyment Act at Thirty: Where Its Been, Where It Is Today, Where Its
Going, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 605-12 (1997) [hereinafter "THIRTY YEARS UNDER THE
ADEA"] (discussing the dramatic increase in women as plaintiffs under the ADEA and
the increasing number of women in the demographics on older workers; suggesting a
further increase in their participation under the ADEA); Patti Buchman, Note, Title
VII Limits on Discrimination Against Television Anclwrwomen on the Basis of AgeRelated Appearance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 190, 195-203 (1985) (arguing that discrimination against television anchor women on the basis of age-related appearance is sex
discrimination under Title VII); Izquierdo Priesto v. Mercado Rosa, 894 F.2d 467 (2nd
Cir. 1983) (plaintiff alleged an Equal Protection violation on the basis of age and sex as
a result of her termination and subsequent replacement by a younger woman where
the employer claimed that it needed "new faces" and that plaintiffs replacement was
"young, attractive and refreshing"); Haskins v. Secretary of HHS, 35 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 256 (W. D. Mo. 1984) (challenging employer policy to consider only that last
ten years of experience when selecting employees for promotional opportunities because the practice had a disparate impact on older workers, particularly women who
were more likely to interrupt their careers for family responsibilities); Judy Klemesrud,
"If Your Face Isn't Young": Women Confront Problems of Aging, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
1980, at A24 (discussing participants and programs at the opening session of a White
House Mini-Conference on societal problems facing older women); Bob Levey, Loads of
Bias If You're an Older Woman, WASHINGTON POST, July 21, 1997, at C10 (discussing
experiences of older women with employment discrimination); Sasha Sadan, KneBSet
Panel Told of Amindar's Discrimination Against Older Women, JERUSALEM POST, 'Feb.
15, 1994, at 3 (discussing claims by older Jerusalem women of being retired early because of their ages, despite government anti-discrimination law prohibiting such conduct and allegations that company gave women lower severance packages than early
retired men); Darlene Stevens & Barbara Sullivan, An Age Old Problem: Job Gains
made by Young Don't Translate to Later Years, CHI. TRIB., May 12, 1991, at 12 (discussing disparaging media images of older women in the workplace); Senator Carol
Mosley-Braun, Women's Retirement Security, 4 ELDER L.J. 493 (1996) (discussing the
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standing problem: lawyers and courts often fail to adequately
consider the "hybrid" nature of the discrimination older women
experience.6 As a consequence, older women who experience
hybrid discrimination are not fully redressed by the legal system.
The term "hybrid discrimination" is particularly appropriate
to describe claims of combined age and sex discrimination
against older women because "hybrid" is defined as "a person or
group produced by the blending of two diverse cultures or traditions."'7 Hybrid discrimination against mid-life to older
women is a hybrid of two long and unfortunate traditions of
discrimination against women and older persons.8 As with the
blending of two traditions, hybrid discrimination against older
women fuses the experience of two different phenomenon into
one, to produce something new: discrimination against older
women as "older women." Increased attention to the problem
of hybrid discrimination against older women is necessary because the participation of older women in the workforce has
increased substantially over the last twenty years and is expected to expand in the next century. 9 This expanding

standard of living gap between men and women at retirement as a result of their participation in the workforce).
6. Throughout this comment, the author refers to combined claims of age and sex
discrimination by older women as "hybrid'" discrimination claims. Hybrid discrimination in this context is discrimination against older women as "older women."
7. See WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1106 (3d ed. 1993).
8. See generally, HAROLD L. SHEPPARD & SARA E. RIX, THE GRAYING OF
WORKING AMERICA: THE COMING CRISIS IN RETIREMENT-AGE POLICY (1977); Diane
Herz and Phillip L. Rones, Institutional Barriers to Employment of Older Workers, 112
MONTHLY LAB. REv. 14 (1989); JUDITH C. HUSHBECK, OLD AND OBSOLETE: AGE
DISCRIMINATION AND THE AMERICAN WORKER, 1860-1920 (Garland 1989); JOSEPH E .
.KALET, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT LAw (2d Ed. 1990) discussing the experiences of older employees with age discrimination. For a discussion of the experiences
of female employees with gender discrimination, see generally, CLAIRE BROWN AND
JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, GENDER IN THE WORKPLACE (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
SEXUAL HARAssMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979);
BARBARA LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KAoUE, SEXUAL HARAssMENT IN EMPLOYMENT LAw
(1992); GENDER INEQUALITY AT WORK (Jerry A. Jacobs, ed., Sage Publications 1995).
9. Female Participation in the Civilian Workforce, 1980 - 2005 (millions)
Ages
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+

1980
8.6
7.0
4.7
1.2
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1990
'14.7
9.1
4.9
1.5

1995
16.6
11.8
5.4
1.6

1996
17.0
12.4
5.5
1.6

2000(proj.)
17.8
14.8
6.6
1.8

2005(proj.)
17.1
17.1
8.6
2.0
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workforce participation by older women may also increase potentiallitigation under both Title VII and the ADEA for hybrid
discrimination.lO However, unless the current analytical structures under Title VII and the ADEA evolve to more adequately
consider the hybrid nature of cases brought by many older
women, the lack of adequate redress will become worse.
This Comment examines two ways in which the legal system does not adequately consider older women's claims of discrimination. The issues are presented in two conceptual
groupings. The first grouping discusses how barriers to the
recognition of hybrid age and sex discrimination claims are
created when courts do not analyze the evidence of discrimination together as evidence of discrimination against "older
women."11 Often, courts analyze hybrid claims of age and sex
discrimination separately under Title VII and the ADEA, even
when the evidence of discrimination points to a hybrid claim
involving discrimination directed at a subset of a protected
group, such as older women, rather than older employees or
women generally.12 This separate analytical approach restricts

Female Participation in the Civilian Workforce, 19BO - 2005 (percent)
Ages
1980
1990
1995
1996
2000(proj.)
2005(proj.)
7B.7
80.0
35-44
65.5
76.4
77.2
77.5
45·54
59.9
71.2
75.4
76.4
7B.2
BO.7
55·64
41.3
45.2
49.2
49.6
53.4
56.6
B.6
9.5
10.2
65+
8.1
8.6
8.8
Source: U. S. DEPI' OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABsTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
2307 tbl. 620, 397 (1997). See last two columns discussing projections of labor force
participation into the year 2000.
10. See THIRTY YEARS UNDER THE ADEA, supra note 5 at 610·12 (discussing ex·
pansion of older women as plaintiffs under the ADEA and possible causes for the in·
crease).
11. See case illustration, Saes v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., No. 90·0536,
1991 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 (S.D.N.Y~Oct. 11, 1991), see infra notes 220·53 and ac·
companying text.
12. See e.g. Murdock v. BF Goodrich, No. 15654, 1992 WL 393158 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 30, 1992) (requiring separate analysis of plaintiffs age and sex discrimination
claims under Title VII and the ADEA); Scharnhorst v. Independent Sch. Dist. #710,
686 F.2d 637 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U. S. 1109 (1983) (finding error when
lower court combined plaintiffs age and sex discrimination claims rather than sepa·
rately analyze each under Title VII and the ADEA) See also Degraffenreid v. General
Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 145 (E. D. Mo. 1976), atrd in part, rev'd in
part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 480 (Bth Cir. 1977) (requiring separate analysis of
Black woman's race and sex discrimination claims).
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a court's consideration of how the discrimination intersects and
can allow employers to defeat older women's claims by showing
older men and younger women are treated favorably, though
unfavorable treatment of older women exists.13
The second grouping discusses how attorneys can fail to recognize and therefore, effectively present the hybrid nature of
the bias in an older woman's discrimination claim.14 First, an
attorney may simply plead discrimination on the basis of age,
without sex, or vice versa because lawyers may neither consider nor investigate whether combined sex and age bias is involved in the discrimination claims brought by an older
woman. The decision to plead age bias without sex can weaken
an older woman's chances of obtaining adequate redress for the
discrimination because it does not provide a complete picture of
the discrimination she experiences since it takes an either/or
approach. 15 Second, lawyers may not examine the benefits of
pleading hybrid age and sex discrimination as "sex-plus" discrimination under Title VII in demonstrating to a court that an
older woman's claims of age and sex discrimination involves
hybrid discrimination against her as an "older woman."16
In Part II, the Comment presents the theoretical models
used to establish a discrimination claim under Title VII and
considers court recognition of multi-factor discrimination
claims involving sex-plus-race and sex-plus-age under the stat-

13. See Saes, 1991 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 and supra notes 250-54 and accompanying text.
14. See case illustration, Crawford v. Medina General Hospital, 96 F.3d 830 (6th
Cir. 1996) infra notes 261-62 and accompanying text.
15. See Kimherle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersectwn of Race and Sex: A
Black Feminist Critique of AntiDiscriminatwn Doctrine, Feminist Theory and
Antiracist Politics, 189 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (discussing the practical and theoretical
shortcomings of a "sectional approach" to analyzing combined discrimination claims in
the context of race and sex discrimination); Elaine W. Shohen, Compound Discriminatwn: The Interactwn ofRace and Sex in Employment Discriminatwn, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
793 (1980) (discussing the problems of compound discrimination created when race and
sex discrimination claims are not considered in their totality as discrimination against
a women as a "woman of color").
16. "Sex-plus" discrimination involves employment practices that treat employees
differently on the basis of their sex plus another characteristic. See infra notes 96-106
and accompanying text for a discussion of the "sex-plus" model of alleging discrimination under Title VII.
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ute. 17 Part II exposes a general presumption in the reasoning
of the courts analyzing hybrid discrimination against older
women that separately, either Title VII or the ADEA provide
adequate protection for their discrimination claims, while the
case outcomes repeatedly result in adverse judgment against
plaintiffs on one or both claims.1s Part III introduces the theoretical models for alleging discriminatory treatment under the
ADEA and discusses the uniform disfavorable treatment by
courts of "age-plus" other factor discrimination claims under
the ADEA. 19
Next, Part IV examines problems created when courts fail to
recognize the hybrid nature of many of the age and sex discrimination claims brought by older women because a number
of courts separate age and sex discrimination into distinct
categories and consider the evidence of discrimination individually.20 Saes v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. is discussed to illustrate one court's use of an individualized analyti17. Specifically, Part II of the comment discusses the theoretical models under Title VII for disparate treatment claims, harassment based upon sex, and "sex-plus"
discrimination. See infra notes 33-106 and accompanying text. It then examines court
treatment of "sex-plus" discrimination involving race and sex claims by women of color.
See infra notes 107-18 and accompanying text. The comment also discusses current
court treatment of age and sex discrimination claims by older women seeking recognition as a protected subclass under the "sex-plus" model available in Title VII actions.
See infra notes 119-46 and accompanying text.
18. See the discussion of Murdock, 1992 WL 393158 and infra notes 125-29 and
accompanying text; see also the discussion of Tiwmpson v. Mississippi Personnel Bd.,
674 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Miss. 1987) infra notes 120-24 and accompanying text, wherein
both courts denied the recognition of discrimination claims by older women as "older
women" in analyzing those claims. In those cases, the court's concluded that the ADEA
and Title VII provide separate remedies to older women for their discrimination claiIDs.
In both instances however, their claims were defeated by evidence of favorable treatment given to other women (under Title VII) and older male employees (under the
ADEA). See also Lam v. University of Hawaii, 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994) (discussing
the inappropriateness of the district court's dismissal of an Asian woman's race and sex
discrimination claims by using evidence of favorable treatment of an Asian male and
white female), discussed infra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
19. See discussion of Kelly v. Drexel University, 907 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
infra notes 171-90 and accompanying text. See also the discussion in Luce v. Dalton,
166 F.R.D. 457 (S.D. Cal. 1996), infra notes 191-204 and accompanying text. Both
courts held that an "age-plus" theory of discrimination under the ADEA does not exist.
See also the discussion of Good v. United States West Communications, Inc., No. 93302-FR, 1995 WL 67672 (D. Or. Feb.16, 1995) infra notes 205-13 and accompanying
text for a discussion on the question of whether Good supports the application of "ageplus" theory to hybrid age and sex discrimination claims under the ADEA.
20. See, e.g., Melnyk v. Adria Laboratories, 799 F. Supp. 301 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
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cal model under Title VII and the ADEA that requires a plaintiff to establish and meet separate requirements under each
statute in order to prove that discrimination occurred on either
distinct basis.21 Saes demonstrates the ways in which a separate analytical model can cause a court to ignore evidence suggesting a hybrid of age and sex in an older woman's discrimination claims wherein separate analysis of each claim can prove
ineffective to address hybrid discrimination.
In Part V, the Comment discusses problems that can occur
when lawyers fail to consider the hybrid nature of older
women's discrimination claims and as a result, plead age discrimination, without sex discrimination or vice versa.22 Next,
Part V critically analyzes the court rationale in Murdock v.
B.F. Goodrich and Thompson v. Mississippi Personnel Bd.
wherein each court refused to recognize older women as a distinct group for protection under Title VII or the ADEA.23 Part
V also argues for the further extension of the "sex-plus" framework under Title VII to include hybrid claims of age and sex
discrimination by adopting the reasoning articulated in Arnett
v. Aspin and argues that "age-plus-sex" claims should be cognizable under the ADEA.24
In Part VI, the Comment presents the author's recommen-

dations for an alternative framework to the individualized
analytical model used by courts for analyzing hybrid discrimination claims: a hybrid approach.25 Part VI explains the bene-

21. See No. 90-0536, 1991 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1991) infra
notes 220-53 and accompanying text.
22. In this section, the Comment makes reference to various types of statements
and conduct that may raise an issue of hybrid age and sex discrimination in an older
woman's discrimination claims. See infra notes 261-63 and accompanying text for
discussion.
23. See No.15654, 1992 WL 393158 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1992), 674 F. Supp.
198 (N.D. Miss. 1987).
24. See 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1238-40 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (articulating the reasoning for
extension of "sex-plus" to age and sex discrimination claims). See infra notes 130-46
and accompanying text for discussion.
25. A hybrid approach is a method of analyzing cases that involve hybrid or multifactor discrimination. Under this approach, courts can consider how the evidence of
one type of discrimination supports an inference that another type of discrimination
also played a part in the challenged employer conduct. For a discussion of the hybrid
approach, with case illustrations, see infra notes 276-319 and accompanying text.
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fits of a hybrid approach to courts because it allows them to
consider how the evidence of one type of discrimination supports an inference of another type of discrimination, in order to
provide comprehensiveness, rather than a segmented view of
the discrimination.26 Part VI also articulates a general pragmatic model for assessing older women's hybrid claims of discrimination so as to assist in providing complete relief to victims of hybrid discrimination.27
II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (AS AMENDED BY
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991f8

When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act in 1964, its
central focus was to eradicate race discrimination against African-Americans and other minority groupS.29 Yet at the time of
its passage, Congress extended Title VII's coverage beyond race
to include the historically disadvantaged category of sex under
its provisions.3o One of the purposes of Title VII is to remove

26. See Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104 (9th
Cir. 1991); Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1987); Lowe v. City of
Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985).
27. Part VI also establishes a framework for lawyers and judges upon which to assess whether hybrid discrimination is involved in the discrimination claims of an older
woman. See infra note 320 and accompanying text.
28. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
29. 78 Stat. 253 (1964), amended by 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). See United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193,202-03 (1979) (The primary concern of Congress
was the economic conditions of Blacks in society).
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2002 (a)-(d) (1994) of Title VII sets out the substantive
standard of employer liability for employment discrimination. Therein it states in
relevant part:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect
his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment
agency to fail or refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
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discriminatory practices and devices that operate in society to
deny equality of employment opportunity to those protected by
its provisions.31 To that effect, Title VII makes it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer, employment agency, or
labor organization to refuse to hire, discharge, or to otherwise
discriminate, limit, segregate, or classify employees on the basis of their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 32

(c) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor.organization(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or to otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership or applicants for
membership or to classify or fail or refuse to refer for employment any
individual, in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
any individual in violation of this section.
(d) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer, labor
organization, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training
programs to discriminate against any individual because of his race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin in, admission to, or employment
in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training.

Id.
Title VII was originally presented as a bill to prohibit employment discrimination based on race, religion and national origin. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88,352, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401. The prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of "sex" was added as a last minute measure. See Leo Kanowitz, Sex·Based Discrimination in American Law III: Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HAST. L.J.
305, 310-12 (1968) (noting that sex discrimination was added to Title VII on the
last day of consideration in order to block passage of the entire act and not to
protect the employment rights of women).
31. See International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 328 (1977);
McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e..(b}-(d) (1994). Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (1994), the term
"employer" under the Act refers to "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year ... " Id.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (c) (1994), the term "employment agency" in Title VII is defined as "any person regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure
employees for an employer or to procure for employees opportunities to work for an
employer and includes an agent of such person. Id.
Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (d) (1994), the term "labor organization" in Title VII is defined as:
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A. Two THEoRIES OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION UNDER
TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
The United States Supreme Court has articulated two general theories of employment discrimination for Title VII claims:
disparate treatment and disparate impact?3 In a disparate
treatment case, the plaintiff must allege that her employer
treated some employees less favorably than others on account
of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.34
The plaintiff must also prove that this disparate treatment was
manifested by either systemic or individual disparate treatment.35 In a disparate impact suit, the plaintiff charges that a
neutral policy or practice of the employer causes a significantly
heavier adverse impact upon a segment of the employees covered by Title VII than other employees.36
1. The Disparate Treatment Models of Discrimination and the
Requirement of Intent to Discriminate
In order to establish a violation of Title VII under the disparate treatment theory of discrimination, a plaintiff must prove
that the employer's action was taken with the intent to dis-

a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce, and
any agent of such an organization, and includes any organization of any
kind, any agency, or employee representation committee, group, association, or plan so engaged which employees participate and in which
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours, or
other terms or conditions of employment, and any conference, general
committee, joint or system board, or joint council so engaged which is
subordinate to a national or international labor organization.
ld.
Exemptions from Title VII's coverage are provided to religious corporations associations and educational or social institutions that employ persons of a particular religious
affiliation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2001(a) (1994). In addition, taX-exempt private clubs
are exempt from Title VII coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (b) (1994). Indian tribes, businesses on or in the vicinity of Indian reservations where they provide preferences to
those persons living therein are exempt. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -2(i) (1994). Aliens employed outside of the United States are also exempt. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e -l(a) (1994).
33. See Hazen Paper Co v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993).
34. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15 (1977). Inteut to discriminate does not
require animus or prejudice; benign motivations may also violate Title VII. See
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282-83 (1976).
35. See Hazen, 507 U.S. at 610.
36. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15.
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criminate.37 Where systemic disparate treatment is involved,
the employer's conduct demonstrates an intent to discriminate
. when formal policies are adopted that take into account the
employee's race, sex, or some other trait protected under Title
VII. 38 Systemic disparate treatment may also exist when the
employer has no formal policy of discrimination, yet consistently discriminates against members of a protected group under Title VII.39
On the other hand, in an allegation of individual disparate
treatment, the plaintiff challenges the employer's actions as
discriminatory on the basis of a protected characteristic, such
as race or sex.40 Though the plaintiffs proof may include evidence alleging that a general atmosphere of discrimination or
discriminatory acts against other individuals existed, a plaintiff in an individual disparate treatment case focuses on the
discriminatory conduct which is directed at plaintiff.41 Both
the systemic and individual disparate treatment theories of
discrimination require proof that the employer intentionally
discriminated.42
2. The Disparate Impact Theory: No Requirement
Discriminatory Intent ill order to Violate Title VII

of

Under the disparate impact theory of discrimination, the
plaintiff is not required to show that the employer possessed
the intent to discriminate against her in order to prove that a
violation of Title VII occurred.43 Disparate impact theory challenges "employment practices that are facially neutral in their
37. See id.
38. See Hazen, 510 U.S. at 610.
39. See id. See, e.g., McDonald, 427 U.S. at 283 (even though no formal policy of
discrimination existed, employer violated Title VII by fIring white employees, but not
black employee for same offense).
40. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15.
41. See e.g., Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593 (lst Cir. 1989). The
additional evidence showing discrimination against other persons and general bias is
often provided in order to bolster the claim by showing that a general atmosphere of
discrimination existed and/or that the employer treated individual's similarly situated
to the plaintiff unfavorably, such as other women, so that the employer more likely
than not treated plaintiff unfavorably. See id.
42. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15.
43. See id.
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treatment of different groups, but that in fact fall more harshly
on one group than another.»44 In a claim for disparate impact,
a plaintiff must establish that the employer's policies creates a
class imbalance between the actual workforce composition and
what it should be if discrimination had not occurred.45 To establish that a disparate impact exists, plaintiffs generally rely
heavily upon statistical disparities.46

B. ESTABLISHING A CASE OF DISPARATE TREATMENT UNDER
TITLE VII47
In order to establish a case for disparate treatment, the
plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer's action was motivated by discriminatory intent.48 The plaintiff may establish
intent to discriminate as a result of either direct, inferential, or
patterns and practice evidence proving intent to discriminate.49

44. Id.
45. See id. at 340 n.20; see also Pouncy v. Prudential InS. Co. of Am., 668 F.2d 795,
800 (5th Cir. 1982).
46. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988).
47. This section discusses only individual disparate treatment claims and models
of proof used therein because those cases discussed in the sections following, with the
exception of Thompson u. Mississippi State Personnel Bd., 674 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Miss.
1987), involve discrimination claims alleging individual disparate treatment. Moreover, the WLDF STUDY found that only five percent of the claims alleging age-and-sex
discrimination used the disparate impact model to state a claim for discrimination. See
WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 12. For a more detailed discussion of the disparate impact model of discrimination under Title VII, see Pamela A Perry, Two Faces of Dispa·
rate Impact Discrimination, 59 FORD. L. REV. 523 (1991); George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objectiue Theory of Discrimination, 73 VA. L. REV 1297
(1987);
48. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15. The Supreme Court has held that the
question of whether or not the employer intends to discriminate as a result of its actions is a question of fact. See United States Postal Service v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 7ll,
715 (1983) (when defendant responds to a prima facie case by offering reason for plaintift's rejection; fact finder then determines the ultimate factual issue of whether defendant intentionally discriminated); Pullman Standard v. Swift, 456 U.S. 273, 289 (1982)
(whether differential impact on seniority system on Blacks reflect an intent to discriminate is a pure question of fact, not mixed question of law and fact).
49. See Lee v. Russell County Bd. of Educ., 684 F.2d 769, 773-74 (llth Cir. 1982);
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15.
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1. The Role of Direct Evidence in Satisfying the Intent To

Discriminate Requirement
Direct evidence of an illegal motive consists of written or
spoken words demonstrating bias against a protected group,
such as "women should not work outside of the home," "blacks
can't do this job," or "I would never hire a foreigner. roO The
plaintiff's evidence must be able to connect the expressed bias
to the challenged employer action in order to establish discriminatory intent. 51 Once direct evidence of discriminatory
intent is presented, a prima facie case of discrimination is established. 52 The employer is then subject to liability for the
impermissible discrimination.53

50. See Slack v. Havens, 7 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 885 (S.D. Cal. 1973), affd as
modified, 522 F.2d 1091, 1092-93 (9th Cir. 1975) (court held statements by employer
that ·colored people should stay in their places" and "colored people are hired to clean
because they clean better" as direct evidence of intent to discriminate where non-Black
employees were excused from cleaning and cleaning was not in the plaintiffs job description); Buckley v. Hospital Corp. of America, 758 F.2d 1525, 1530 (11th Cir. 1985)
(holding that supervisor's comment that the Hospital needed "new blood" and that he
intended to recruit younger staff, in conjunction with the conduct that led to plaintiffs
termination was sufficient to establish direct evidence of discrimination).
51. See, e.g., Grant v. Hazelett Strip-Casting Corp., 880 F.2d 1564, 1568 (2d Cir.
1989).
52. See Trans World Airlines v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
53. Where direct evidence of discrimination is proven, an employer may attempt to
escape liability by demonstrating that the same employment decision would have been
made, absent the impermissible consideration. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S.
228 (1989). In Price· Waterhouse, a female employee of an accounting firm alleged sex
discrimination in the decision not to promote her to partner. See id. at 231-32. Hopkins presented direct evidence that unlawful considerations entered into the employer's
decision. See id. The employer rebutted plaintiffs evidence by demonstrating legitimate factors were also considered in reaching its decision. See id. at 251-52. PriceWaterhouse's holding was modified by the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
wherein Congress provided that an unlawful employment practice is established when
the complaining party demonstrates that discrimination played any part in the adverse
employment action. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(m) (1994). Furthermore, Congress provided that a court finding that impermissible
discrimination was involved in the employer's decision could award declaratory relief
and attorney's fees attributable to the pursuit of the discrimination claim. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2005(g)(2)(B)(i) (1994). Congress also provided a defense to a finding of
complete liability under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e 5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (1994). Therein it provides that where an employer that can demonstrate
the same decision would have been made in the absence of the impermissible factor, it
shall not be subject to an award of damages or a court order requiring "admission,
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment" to the plaintiff once it has met this
burden. See id.
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Cases presenting direct evidence of discrimination can also
involve proof of both legitimate and illegitimate reasons for the
employer's actions. These cases, referred to as "mixed motive"
cases, arise where an employer takes into account more than
one reason for its decision and the plaintiff proves that at least
one of the employer's motives is unlawful.54 Once the evidence
of an illegal motive is connected to the employment action, a
burden of production shifts to the employer.55 The employer
must prove that the same decision would have been made, in
the absence of the impermissible factor in order to escape complete liability for the discrimination.56
2. The Use of Inferential Evidence to Establish an Employer's
Discriminatory Intent
A plaintiff may also establish intent to discriminate absent
direct evidence, by creating an inference of discriminatory intent through the use of a three-step analytical framework articulated in McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green. 57 The McDonnell-Douglas framework requires that a plaintiff in a Title VII
action must carry the initial burden of establishing a prima
facie case of discrimination.58 The plaintiff must show: (i)
membership in a protected group, (ii) that she applied and was
qualified for a job which the employer had available, (iii) that
she was rejected, and (iv) that following the rejection, the employer continued to seek applicants from individual's with the
plaintiffs qualifications.59
The three steps articulated in McDonnell-Douglas to infer
discriminatory intent begin with the establishment of the

54. See Price· Waterhouse , 490 U.S. at 250 (modified by Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071). See also e.g., Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586,
597 (3d Cir. 1995).
55. See Price-Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252. A burden of production requires a
party to introduce enough evidence to avoid an adverse resolution by the judge. See
GLEN WEISSENBERGER, WEISSENBERGER'S EVIDENCE 53 (2d ed., Anderson Publishing
Co. 1995) [hereinafter "WEISSENBERGER'S EVIDENCE"]. See also supra note 53 for an
explanation of what liability attaches at this point.
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2005(gX2XbXi) & (ii) (1994).
57. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
58. McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
59. See id.
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prima facie case.60 Next, the burden of production shifts to the
employer.61 The burden requires the employer-defendant to
articulate a "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for the employment decision.62 The employer's reason for the challenged
action must be one from which a court could infer a lawful motive for the employment decision.63 If the employer fails to present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff may be entered.64 However, the inference of
discrimination created by the prima facie case is destroyed once
the employer carries the burden of producing a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action.65 Finally, the burden
shifts back to the plaintiff, this time as a burden of persuasion,
to prove to the trier of fact that the employer's explanation for
its action is not the true reason, or that it is a pretext for the
employer's discriminatory motive.66

60.
61.
62.
63.

See id.
See id.
McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
See id. at 802-03. An employer can also challenge the facts used by plaintiff to

establish a prima facie case, such as the plaintiff did not meet the minimum qualifications to be considered for the position. See e.g., Hawkins v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 697
F.2d 810, 813 (8th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff need only prove qualifications to the person who
received the position to meet her prima facie burden in proving employment discrimination); Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1253 (8th Cir. 1981) (to establish
a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, appellants must show, inter alia, that
they were capable of performing the job).
64. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.9 (1981).
The Supreme Court decision in St Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)
modified the framework discussed in Burdine. The Court majority in Hicks held that
the rejection of an employer's asserted reasons for its actions does not require the trier
offact to render ajudgment for the plaintiff. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 519.
The Hicks decision endorses the view that even when a plaintiff has met the
McDonnell-Douglas burden shifting test and the employer has not come forth with a
credible explanation for the employment action, the fact fmder can choose to ignore the
evidence and find that some other reason must have motivated the employer's conduct,
although the employer has not put forth such an argument. For further discussion and
analysis of the decision in Hicks, see Michael J. Lambert, St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks: The ·Pretext-Maybe Approach, 29 NEW ENGLAND L. REv. 163 (1994); Michael C.
Phillips, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: The Casual Abandonment Of Title VII
Precedent, 23 CAP. U. L. REV. 1054 (1994). For cases applying the Hicks standard, see
Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1123-126 (7th Cir. 1994); Ellis v.
NCNB Tex. Nat'l Bank, 842 F. Supp. 243, 247-49 (N. D. Tex. 1994).
65. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
66. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804. A burden
of persuasion is the burden of persuading the trier of fact of the elements of a claim or
D
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The plaintiffs burden of persuasion may be met "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason
more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. 1IS7 This burden of persuasion rests at all times with the
plaintiff.68 If the court concludes that the plaintiffs proof is
insufficient to prove intent to discriminate, the employerdefendant is entitled to a judgment.69 If, on the other hand, the
plaintiff produces sufficient evidence to raise an issue of fact as .
to the employer's true motivation, the fact finder must determine whether the pblintiff has carried the burden of persuasion by showing that the employer's actions were illegally motivated.70 If the fact finder agrees, the plaintiff has met this
burden, then the plaintiff must prevail, unless an employer can
utilize an affirmative defense to liability.
Title VII permits the use of a bona fide seniority or merit
system in establishing differing compensation, terms, privileges and conditions amongst employees, so long as they are
"not the result of an intent to discriminate. 1f71 Employers may
also utilize the statutory defense of a "bona fide occupational
qualification" ("BFOQ") in disparate treatment actions for policies that take religion, sex, or national origin into consideration.72 Employer's claims that a "bona fide occupational qualification" exists will be upheld only "in those certain instances
where religion, sex, ·or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise. 1f73

defense in accordance with the degree of proof mandated by the substantive law. See
WEISSENBERGER'S EVIDENCE, supra note 55.

67. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
68. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511.
69. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 519; McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807.
70. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 509-10; McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 807..
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2002(h) (1994).
72. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2002(eXl) (1994).
73. See id. See e.g., Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred Compensation Plan v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083-84 (1983) (holding "distinctions based on sex are prohibited under Title VII unless they fall within the narrow
scope of a bona fide occupational exception"); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d
1273, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that a foreign customer's preference for male employees does not establish a BFOQ).
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3. Utilizing the Pattern and Practice Model as a Means to
Establish Employer Intent To Discriminate

An individual plaintiff may also utilize a pattern and practice model of proof to establish a violation of Title VII, without
having to prove by direct evidence that the employer intended
to discriminate. 74 Pattern and practice proof of discrimination
is usually involved in class action suits wherein multiple plaintiffs allege discrimination under a disparate impact theory of
discrimination.75 However, pattern and practice discrimination
may also be used when an individual plaintiff alleges discrimination. 76 A plaintiffs evidence must show that the challenged
conduct was a regular employer practice or pattern and created
a disproportionate impact.77 A prima facie case may be established by the use of statistics alone, or in conjunction with
other evidence. 78 The evidence must be able to demonstrate
that the employer's practice is a greater barrier to employment
opportunities for members of the protected group than other
employees.

The BFOQ defense applies to disparate treatment claims of intentional discrimination, but not disparate impact cases where a facially neutral employer practice is involved and a business necessity defense applies. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187,
198-200 (1991) (holding that BFOQ defense, not business necessity, is the appropriate
standard for disparate treatment cases and because the employer policy was not facially neutral, it could not constitute a disparate impact, therefore only the BFOQ
defense was available). See also Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 1052
Stat. 1071 (1991), at § 105 ("A demonstration that an employment practice is required
by business necessity may not be used as a defense against a claim of intentional discrimination under this title") codified at, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(c)(2) (1994). See
infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text discussing business necessity.
74. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 357-59 n.45.
75. See e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 751 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975). See supra note 42-46 and accompanying text for an explanation and articles discussing the disparate impact model of
discrimination under Title VII.
76. See Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 698-99 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that
lower court erred in excluding statistical proof in individual discrimination case); Cox
v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1559 (11th Cir. 1986) (explaining that
individual claims alleging pattern and practice discrimination follows the Teamsters
format).
77. See McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249, 1259 (10th Cir. 1988).
78. See Dillion v. Coles, 746 F.2d 998,1003-04 (3d Cir. 1984).
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Once the plaintiff establishes pattern and practice discrimination, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer.79 The
employer must prove that the plaintiff was not the victim of
discrimination.so The employer can attempt to rebut the plaintiff's showing of disparity by attacking the statistics introduced
by the plaintiff to establish her case.81 The employer may also
claim an affirmative defense to a prima facie showing of pattern and practice discrimination by establishing that its practice is justified as "job related and consistent with business necessity.~2 A business necessity defense requires an employer
to prove both a compelling need for the challenged practice and
that its lacks effective alternatives that would not produce a
similar disparate impact.83 If the employer fails to produce
evidence supporting its business justification, the plaintiff
must prevail.84

79. See Teamsters, 411 U.S. at 359.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 360-61 n.46.
82. See Roe v. Cheyenne Mountain Conference Resort, 920 F. Supp. 1153, 1155 (D.
Colo. 1996). See also Dowthard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Griggs, 401
U.S. at 432 (holding that the burden of proving business necessity requires "a manifest
relationship to the employment in question"). In rebutting plaintiffs statistics, an
employer may choose to argue that the statistics do not actually demonstrate a statistically significant adverse impact upon the protected group, or that the statistics are
over-inclusive. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kip's Big Boy, 424 F. Supp. 500 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
The "business necessity" defense is a judicially created defense made available to
employers when a facially neutral employment policy has been shown to have a disproportionate impact on members of a protected class. The seminal case addressing
"business necessity" is Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), in which the
United States Supreme Court held that in order to justifY the business necessity defense, an employer must show that its practice has "a manifest relationship to the
employment in question." Id. at 432. The Court, in 1989, reduced the standard in 1989
in Wards Cove Packing Co. Inc. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). The new standard
articulated in Wards Cove required a demonstration by the employer that the practice
"serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer." Id. at
659. The Wards Cove holding was expressly overruled by the Civil Rights Act of 1991
amendments to Title VII. Congress expressed its intention "to codify business necessity and job relatedness enunciated in Griggs and other Supreme Court decisions prior
to Wards Cove." See § 3, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071. Moreover, amendments
to Title VII, under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, specifically codified the circumstances
which are demonstrative of a disparate impact under Title VII wherein a business
necessity defense applies. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
83. See e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 797 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying standard from Civil Rights Act of 1991 amendments codifYing business necessity).
84. See id.
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C. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ACTIONS INVOLVING
HARAsSMENT BASED UPON SEX: Two TYPES OF ACTIONS
CREATE THE PRIMA FACIE CASE

Older women's hybrid claims of age and sex discrimination
may involve conduct by the employer that constitutes harassment. Sexual harassment in employment is "the imposition of
an unwanted condition on the continued employment or on the
receipt of an employment benefit on account of the person's
gender.,,85 Those acts constituting sexual harassment may be
sexual in nature, or they may involve intimidation and hostility
on the basis of gender, though no explicit sexual conduct is involved.86 Two theories address claims of harassment based
upon sex: quid pro quo and hostile environment.87
In a quid pro quo harassment case, the plaintiff alleges that
the employer explicitly or implicitly connects an employment
benefit to the grant of sexual favors. 88 A prima facie case of
"quid pro quo" sexual harassment requires that the plaintiff
show the existence of "unwelcome" sexual conduct and that the
response to this conduct was predicated upon the possibility
that some adverse management decision would affect the plaintiff's compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment.89 A quid pro quo cause of action is available only when
the harasser is a supervisor with actual or apparent authority
to cause the plaintiff some economic harm.90 In those in85. BARBARA S. GAMBLE, SEX DISCRIMINATION HANDBOOK 58 (BNA 1992) !hereinafter "HANDBOOK"J. Although Title VII has included a prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex since its inception in 1964, court interpretation extending Title
VII's protections to sexual harassment was not accepted until 1976. See id. at 60. See
Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.C.C. 1976), rev'd in part, vacated in part, 587
F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See also Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 990 (D.C. Cir.
1977).
86. See Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 447 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that a plaintiff may demonstrate a sexually charged work place in the absence of blatant unwelcome sexual conduct); Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 893 F. Supp. 1263, 1277
(D.Del. 1994) (holding that nonsexual conduct contributed to the creation of a hostile
environment for plaintiff, as well as sexually explicit conduct).
87. See HANDBOOK, supra note 85.
BB. See Nichols v. Frank, 42 F.3d 503, 511 (9th Cir. 1994).
89. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986); Henson v. City
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-04 (11th Cir. 1982) (delineating a prima facie case showing of quid pro quo sexual harassment).
90. See, e.g., Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773,777-78 (2d Cir. 1994).
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stances, an employer is held strictly liable for the conduct of
supervisory employees.91
In a harassment case involving a hostile environment, the
plaintiff alleges that the adverse treatment is gender based,
irrespective of whether the conduct is sexual in nature.92
Regular and repeated insults, slurs, epithets, jokes based upon
gender, increased supervision and criticisms, as well as sexually explicit conduct may all encompass a hostile working environment. 93 The plaintiff in a sexual harassment hostile envi91. See id. at 780.
92. See Gallegos, 26 F.3d at 447 (holding that a plaintiff can establish a sexually
hostile work environment without proving blatant sexual misconduct). Hostile work
environment was first established as a cause of action in Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234
(5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972). Rogers involved a claim by a His. panic employee that her employer segregated Hispanic patients from other patients,
thereby creating offensive working conditions. See id. at 237. Rogers held that a violation of Title VII existed because the employer's conduct created a working environment
"heavily polluted with discrimination." Id. at 238. The court relied on the language
"terms, conditions, or privileges" embodied in Title VII's provisions to find a viable
claim. Id. Since its inception in Rogers, courts have applied hostile environment theory
to various causes of action, including cases based upon race, religion, sex, and age
discrimination.
For cases discussing racial harassment hostile environment, see Vance v. Southern
Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co, 863 F.2d 1503, 1506 (11th Cir. 1989) (racial hostile
environment was proven where incidents included the hanging of a noose hanging over
an employee's work station); Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D.
Me. 1991) (racial hostile environment established by supervisor's expressed racial
hatred ofplaintifl); EEOC Report Dec. No. 72-0779, 4 Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 317, 318
(Dec. 30, 1971) (African-American employee repeatedly referred to as "Nigger").
For a case discussing religious hostile environment, see Compston v. Borden, Inc.,
424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (supervisor making demeaning religious slurs). See
also Steven D. Jamar, Accommodating Religion at Work: A Principled Approach to Title
VII and Religious Freedom, 40 N. Y. L. Scn. L. REV. 719 (1996).
For cases discussing age-based hostile environment, see Crawford v. Medina General Hospital, 96 F.3d 830 (6th Cir. 1996) (plaintiffs evidence of hostility amounted to
hostility between coworkers, rather than hostility based upon age); Drez v. E.R. Squibb
& Sons, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 1432, 1436 (D. Kan. 1987) (holding that harassment was
demonstrated by criticisms, confrontations and personnel file memo referring to plaintiff as an "absolute moron"). See also Julie Vigil, Expanding the Hostile Environment
Theory to Cover Age Discrimination: How Far is Too Far?, 23 PEPP. L. REV. 565 (1996).
93. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66 (explaining that sexual harassment reflecting gender-based animosity is comparable to race or national origin discrimination).
In Meritor, the Supreme Court endorsed the use of agency principles in attaching liability to an employer for sexual harassment hostile environment, but did not expressly decide when employer liability attaches for supervisory personnel's actions that
amount to harassment. See id. at 72. Instead, the Court enunciated guidelines
wherein it concluded that employers are not always liable for their supervisor's conduct, but noted that the absence of notice regarding the. supervisor's conduct does not
necessarily insulate the employers from liability. See id. Courts have found Meritor's
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ronment claim must demonstrate that harassing conduct was
unwelcome, and was "sufficiently severe or pervasive so as "to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an
abusive working environment. ~ Factors to be considered in
determining whether a sexually hostile work environment exists include the frequency and severity of the conduct, whether
it involved physical, verbal assaults or humiliation and
whether the conduct created an unreasonable interference with
the employee's work performance.95
D. "SEX-PLUS" DISCRIMINATION UNDER TITLE VII: PROVIDING A
REMEDY FOR DISPARATE TREATMENT OF A SUBCLASS OF
WORKERS

The "Sex-plus" theory recognizes disparate treatment by an
employer of persons based upon a combination of factors. "Sexplus" refers to employer conduct whereby the employer treats
employees differently on the basis of sex plus another charac-

guidance difficult to follow, however, and as a result, adopt differing standards for
liability. Some courts follow modified, arguably misapplied, respondeat superior principals as articulated in Henson, 682 F.2d at 905 to establish when an employer is responsible for supervisory employee conduct as a "knew or had reason to know" test.
See e.g., Nichols 42 F.3d at 508 (holding correct standard to apply is the "know or
should have known" test). Courts have also adopted an agency principle theory to determine when employer liability attaches. See Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., 970
F.2d 178, 181-83 (6th Cir. 1992). Still other cases have applied an individual model of
liability to supervisory personnel by finding that they act entirely outside of the scope
of employment. See Dockter v. RudolfWolft'Futures, Inc., 684 F. Supp. 532, 536 (N. D.
Ill. 1988) (holding supervisor's behavior committed solely for his own benefit and enjoyment, not employers). For a discussion on the holding in Meritor and methods of
determining liability for sexual harassment hostile environments see Robert Lukens,
Comment, Workplace Sexual Harassment & Individual Liability, 69 TEMP.. L. REV. 303
(1996); David B. Oppenheimer, Exacerbating the Exasperating: Title VII Liability of
Employers For Sexual Harassment Committed By Their Supervisors, 81 CORNELL L.
REv. 66 (1995); Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under
Agency Principals: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L.
REV. 1229 (1991).
94. Meritor, 477 U. S. at 67-68.
95. See Harris v. Forklifl; Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993). The U.S. Supreme
Court, in Harris, clarified what level of subjective impact a plaintiff need demonstrate
in order to establish that an abusive hostile environment exists. Though the Court
concluded that psychological injury was not required in order to establish a sufficiently
severe or pervasive hostile environment, it determined that psychological injury could
be considered as one factor, among others in the plaintiff's case. See id.
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teristic. 96 In a claim for "sex-plus" discrimination, a plaintiff
alleges that the employer does not discriminate against men or
women generally, but against a subclass of men or women.97
The focus in a "sex-plus" claim is on the analysis used to evaluate the discrimination against members of a subset of the protected group, rather than on a distinct method of pleading.
Discrimination claims alleging "sex-plus" discrimination may
encompass the direct, circumstantial, or pattern and practice
method of proof.98 Such discrimination is covered by Title VII's
prohibitions because Title VII is not limited to employment discrimination "solely" upon the basis of sex.99
A large number of "sex-plus" cases involve employer policies
or practices that disparately treat subclass members of a group
protected under Title VII. 1OO An example may be an employer
96. Courts have held that distinctions between employees based upon certain
categories of characteristics establish the resulting "sex-plus" job requirement as sexually discriminatory in violation of Title VII. Most often these include requirements
that directly or indirectly involve: 1) immutable physical characteristics, 2) characteristics which while mutable involve fundamental, legally protected rights, such as the
right to have children or marry, and 3) characteristics which although mutable, significantly effect employment opportunities or conditions of employment for members of one
sex because their use perpetuates the effects of sexual stereotypes. See infra note 100
for case examples.
A mutable characteristic is dermed as a thing that is capable of change or being
changed in form, quality or nature. WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL NEW DICTIONARY 1492
(3d Michael J. Phillips, Employer Sexual Harassment Liability Under Agency Principals: A Second Look at Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1229
(1991) ed. 1993). An immutable characteristic is defined as a thing that is not capable
or susceptible to change. See id. at 1131.
97. The term "sex-plus" was introduced by Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit in a
dissent to the denial of a petition of rehearing en banc in Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated
and remanded, 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (per curium).
98. See e.g. Price-Waterhouse, 440 U.S. 228 (1989) (direct evidence); Nashville Gas
Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977) (pattern and practice case); Graham v. Bendix Co.,
585 F. Supp. 1036 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (circumstantial evidence).
99. During Title VII's passage, an amendment was proposed that would have limited the scope of Title VII"s reach in the context of sex discrimination by placing the
word "solely" before the word "sex" into its provisions. The proposal was specifically
rejected. See 110 CONGo REC. 2728 (1964). The fIrst court to interpret this legislative
history as authorizing sex plus other factors is Jeffries V. Harris Community Action
Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir 1980). See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Jeffries.
100. See Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock CO. V. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983)
(holding that an employer policy that provided less coverage for pregnancy-related
conditions to the spouses of male employees than female employees of the company
constituted sex discrimination against male employees); Nashville Gas, 434 U.S. 136
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policy that excludes all women of childbearing age from certain
job classifications. lOl Employment classifications involving
"plus" factors are considered impermissible "because they present obstacles to employment of one sex that cannot be overcome."I02
The u.S. Supreme Court recognized that disparate treatment against a subclass of a protected group violates Title VII
in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. 103 Phillips involved an
established employer practice of refusing to hire women with
pre-school age children but not siniilarly situated men with
young children.104 Though the majority of applicants hired by
Martin Marietta were women, the Court recognized that the
plaintiffs could still establish a violation of Title VIl 105 Since
the U. S. Supreme Court's initial treatment of "sex-plus" in
Phillips, the doctrine has been extended to cover other classifications under Title VIl lOG

(holding that an employers policy of denying accumulated seniority benefits to female
employees returning from maternity leave, although facially neutral, imposed a significant burden on female employees that male employees do not experience); Wanbeheim
v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 642 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that employer's benefits
rule that allowed medical insurance to a spouse only if the employee earned more than
5% of the families combined income could demonstrate a disparate impact against
women where 63% of the married females employees could not obtain spousal benefits);
Jacob v. Martin Sweets Co., 550 F.2d 364, 371 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that company
policy that fires single women who become pregnant violates Title VII); Sprogis v.
United Airlines Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)
(holding that employer's policy of terminating married female flight attendants, but not
males, violates Title VII).
101. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (holding that excluding women of childbearing age from certain job classifications, in order to protect unborn fetuses from
potential birth defects, discriminates against women on the basis of sex).
102. See Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th
Cir.1976).
103. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
104. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544. See also Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198 (refusal to retain
married women as flight attendants, but not men).
105. See Phillips 400 U.S. at 543-44.
106. See infra notes 106, 110 for additional case cites.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1998

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 2

138 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:115
1. Treatment of Combined Race and Sex Discrimination
Claims of "Sex-Plus" Under Title VII: General Acceptance By
The Legal Community of The Model
Various courts have recognized that women of color may experience a unique form of discrimination that is separate and
apart from the experiences of white females or males of color.107
For example, Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n
held that sex and race discrimination against black women
could establish a violation of Title VII, absent discrimination
against black males or white females. 108 Jeffries involved a
suit by Dafro Jeffries against her employer in which she alleged race and sex discrimination in promotional opportunities
for black women in violation of Title VIl 109 The employees
promoted to the positions sought by Jeffries were a black male
and a white female. no In holding that Jeffries could establish a
claim of discrimination against black women on the basis of sex
and race, the court noted that in light of the rationales articulated in the "sex-plus" case law, distinctions in employment
practices on the basis of an immutable characteristic or a protected trait violate Title VII.lll

107. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1414 (lOth Cir. 1987) (black
women could establish discrimination absent discrimination against black males and
non-black females); Graham v. Bendrix Corp., 585 F. Supp. 1036, 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984)
(black women are protected against discrimination on the grounds of race and a sex).
See also Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL L. REV.
1467 (l992), Crenshaw, supra note 15; Shoben, supra note 15; Judith Winston, Mirror,
Mirror on the Wall: Title VII, Section 1981, and the Intersection of Race and Gender in
the Civil Rights Act of 1991,79 CAL. L. REV. 775 (1991).
108. See 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th Cir. 1980).
109. See Jeffries, 615 F.2d at 1029.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 1033. The Jeffries court also relied on Phillips, 400 U.S. 542, and
cited to other courts treatments of subclass discrimination following the Supreme
Court's decision in Phillips. The court cited In re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings,
582 F.2d 1142, 1145 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding that employers' policy requiring female
flight attendants with children to accept ground duty positions, but not men, is sex
discrimination); Barnes, 561 F.2d at 984 (female employee's job was abolished as a
result of rebuffing unwanted sexual advances of employer); Jacobs, 550 F.2d at 371
(company practice of firing single women who became pregnant violates Title VII);
Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1198 (no-marriage rule for female stewardesses violates Title VII);
and Jurinko v. Wiegand Co., 331 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (W.O. Pa 1971) (refusal to hire
married women, but not men violates Title VII). The court also explained that the
majority of case law rejecting "sex-plus" involved hair-length regulations for men. See
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Similarly, in Lam v. University of Hawaii, the Ninth Circuit
sustained a race and sex claim by holding that when a plaintiff
alleges that two bases for the discrimination simultaneously
exist, they should not be reduced into distinct categories for
analysis. 112 The plaintiff in Lam was a woman of Vietnamese
descent, who was considered and ultimately rejected for the
position as director of the University Law School Pacific Asian
Legal Studies program. 113
As proof of discrimination Lam offered statements by members of the Selection Committee, demonstrating bias against
Lam and toward women and Asians in general.114 The district
court granted the University's summary judgment motion on
Lam's claims of age and sex discrimination because it concluded that the University had given favorable consideration to
an Asian male and white female for the directorship position.u5
The Appellate Court for the Ninth Circuit held that Lam's
allegations were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination under Title VIl. uS The Appellate Court reasoned that because Lam's claims alleged combined race and sex
bias, a determination as to whether the alleged discrimination

Phillips, 400 u.s. at 1033. The court cited Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines,
Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir. 1976) and Knott v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.,
527 F.2d 1249, 1252 (8th Cir. 1975).
In reaching its decision, the Jeffries court examined the legislative history of Title
VII where the House of Representatives explicitly refused to adopt an amendment to
the bill that would have added the word "solely" to modify "sex," in the list of prohibitions under Title VII. See Jeffries, 615 F.2d at 1032, citing 110 CONGo REc. 2728
(1964). Jeffries holding recognized that race and sex are both immutable characteristics. But see Degraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 145
(E.D. Mo. 1976), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir.
1977) (holding that black women do not constitute a protected subclass under Title VII,
thus separate analysis of their sex and race claims is required).
112. See 40 F.3d 1551 (9th Cir. 1994).
113. See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1554-55 (Lam's parentage was both French and Vietnamese). Lam also alleged national origin discrimination. See id.
114. See id. at 1560. One professor who chaired the selection committee during the
first of three searches initiated by the University made disparaging comments about
Lam's abilities before the selection committee and the campus faculty, while another
member remarked that the directorship should be given to a male, as a result of stereotyped assumptions on the part of the professor that some Asian cultures would not
accept a female chairperson. See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1560.
115. See id. at 156l.
116. See id. at 1561-62.
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against Lam occurred on the basis of the combination of factors, rather than a separate consideration of whether the employer discriminated against people of Lam's same sex or race
was necessary.ll7 Accordingly, the Appellate Court reinstated
Lam's age and sex discrimination claim.us
2. Treatment of Combined Age and Sex Discrimination Claims
as "Sex-Plus" under Title VII
Although a series of appellate decisions involving race and
sex discrimination claims by women of color have established
them as a protected group under Title VII, no federal appellate
court has extended subclass protection under Title VII to "older
women."U9 Several lower courts have considered the question
of whether or not older women can constitute a protected subclass of persons over forty who are female. The decisions have
produced mixed results.
a. Cases Refusing To Recognize Older Women As a Protected
Subclass Under Title VII

In Thompson v. Mississippi State Personnel Bd., a Mississippi district court refused to recognize women over forty as a
protected class for disparate impact analysis. l20 The plaintiff in
Thompson alleged both sex and age discrimination and sought
to introduce evidence comparing herself to men forty and over
and women under forty in order to prove that the employer's
requirements for consideration to a management position had a
disparate impact upon her as an older woman.l2l The district
court for the Northern District of Mississippi refused to consider this evidence as properly demonstrative of age and sex

117. See id. at 1562.
118. See id. at 1566.
119. But see Scharhorst v. Independent Sch. Diat. #710, 686 F.2d 637 (8th Cir.
1982) (fmding that the trial court committed harmless error when it combined plaintiffs age and sex claims).
120. 674 F. Supp. 198 (N.D. Miss 1987). For an explanation of disparate impact,
see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
121. See Thompson, 674 F. Supp. at 202. Specifically, Thompson alleged that the
educational requirements discriminated against both women and persons over forty
and that the combination of her sex and age was impacted by the employer's policy.
See id. at 201.
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discrimination against Thompson because it concluded that
"neither Title VII, nor the ADEA recognized older women as a
protected class for adverse impact analysis. "122
The district court, in holding that plaintiff's statistical evidence was insufficient to show a disparate impact against older
employees or women, considered as the proper pool for analysis
only the statistical evidence comparing all men with all women
and all employees over forty with one another.123 Moreover, the
court analytically separated the sex and age evidence, without
considering what relationship combined age and sex played in
the alleged disparate impact. Under this analysis, the court
held that the plaintiff had failed to establish that a disparate
impact existed on the basis of the employee's ages or sexes.124
Similarly, in Murdock v. B.F. Goodrich, the Ohio Appellate
Court rejected the plaintiff's combined age and sex allegations
of hostile environment discrimination against "older females"
in promotional and training opportunities in favor of younger
men. 125 The Ohio Appellate Court held that "older females are
not a separate protected class under state or federal law," and
therefore, reasoned that an older woman's age and sex claims
must be analyzed separately from one another because separate anti-d.iscrimination statutes were implicated in the
claims. 126 As a result of this reasoning, the defendant obtained
a summary judgment on both claims.127 The sex discrimination
claim was rebutted through the employer's showing that other
women had been promoted.128 Because the court determined

122. [d. at 203-04. At the time of the action, plaintiff was fifty-nine years old. See
id. at 201. The requirementa included either a college degree, plus one year of experience, or two years of college, plus three years of experience. See id.
123. See Tlwmpson, 674 F. Supp. at 207-8.
124. See id. at 211.
125. See No. 15654, 1992 WL 393158 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec 30, 1992) at *3. For a discussion of hostile work environment, see supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
126. Murdock, 1992 WL 393158 at *3.
127. See id.
128. See id. The court's analysis of Murdock's evidence infers that the female employees promoted over Murdock were younger women. After rejecting Murdock's claim
alleging discrimination against ·older females,· the court commented:
Our review of the recent history of. promotions in Murdock's deparment
with respect to the two protected classes does not reveal evidence of either age or sex discrimination. While Murdock contends that no women
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that Murdock did not present evidence that all individuals over
forty were not promoted, the Appellate Court concluded that
the evidence of age discrimination against older women was
insufficient to establish a claim of pure age discrimination.l29
Both Thompson and Murdock represent the current view
that Title VII provides a separate remedy for discrimination
against older women, apart from the ADEA. These courts consider Title VII and the ADEA protections to be mutually exclusive. Yet in each case, neither woman prevailed when the court
considered the evidence of sex and age discrimination individually, rather than on the basis of the combination of both factors.

b. Cases Recognizing Older Women As a Subclass Under Title
VII
In Arnett v. Aspin, however, the Pennsylvania district court

for the Eastern District recognized that sex and age discrimination against older women could constitute protected subclass
discrimination under Title VII. 130 In Arnett, the federal government employed plaintiff, Mary Arnett, a forty-nine year old
woman, as a computer specialist.l31 Arnett sought two promotions to the position of equal employment specialist.132 Each
time, the position went to a woman under the age of forty.l33
The employer admitted that every other person in the position
was a woman under forty or a man over the age offorty.l34 Ar-

have ever been promoted above her in her department, according to
Murdock's exhibit 2 attached to her response to Goodrich's motion for
summary judgment, Kin Singleton was promoted above her. Also, according to her exhibit, another female, Joanne Mahebakken was hired
into a position above Murdock. As for individuals over forty, Murdock
has neither presented any evidence that individuals in that class were
not promoted (emphasis added).
[d.
129. See Murdock, 1992 WL 393158 at *3. Because the court did not recognize
older women as a protected group, it gave no weight to the evidence presented of discrimination against older females as indicative of subset discrimination. See id.
130. See 846 F. Supp. 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
131. See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1236.
132. See id.
133. See id. The flrSt position went to a woman under 30 years old. See id. The
second position was given to a 29-year-old woman. See id.
134. See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1236-37.
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nett alleged sex-pIus-age discrimination in promotional opportunities for older women under Title VII. I35
Defendants moved for summary judgment on the sex-plusage claim. l36 They argued that Arnett's claim was not cognizable under Title VII because age discrimination is afforded protection under a separate statute and all other "sex plus" classifications involve either an already protected classification under Title VII or an unprotected classification.137 Defendants
also argued that Arnett's claim of sex-pIus-age discrimination
should be considered as two separate claims.l38 In considering
the defendants' motion, Judge Reed noted that the acceptance
of defendants' construction of Title VII would result in neither
of plaintiffs claims surviving summary judgment.139
Judge Reed observed that Arnett's claim of "sex-pIus-age"
discrimination failed to establish a claim for pure sex discrimination. 140 Moreover, Judge Reed acknowledged that Arnett's
age discrimination claim alone was insufficient to state a cause
of action because pure age discrimination is not cognizable under Title VII, and age discrimination under the ADEA was not
separately plead. l4l In denying defendant's motion, the court
recognized that "[i]n a "sex-plus" discrimination case, the Title
VII plaintiff does not allege that an employer discriminated
against a protected class as a whole, but rather that the employer disparately treated a subclass within the protected
class."142 Judge Reed explained that this approach closes a
"loophole" in Title VII's protections that allow an employer to

135. See id.
136. See id. at 1238.
137. See id. at 1240. The court concluded that without supporting authority mandating the limitations argued by defendant, the distinctions in the prior case law were
insignificant. See id.
138. See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1238.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. For a discussion of the ADEA, see infra notes 147-70 and accompanying text.
142. Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1238.
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escape liability for subset discrimination by showing that it
does not discriminate against all women or older employees.l43
In support of this approach, the Arnett court cited Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., wherein the Supreme Court first recognized discrimination against a subset rather than all individuals within a protected class as actionable discrimination. 144
The Arnett court concluded that Title VII "sex-plus" case law
applies where the plaintiff demonstrates that the defendant
discriminated against a subclass of women or men based on
either (1) an immutable characteristic or (2) the exercise of a
fundamental right.l45 Moreover, the Arnett court analogized
"sex-plus" case law involving race-plus-sex to reason that the
extension of "sex-plus" claims to sex-plus-age is permissible
wider Title VII. 146

143. See id. at 1240.
144. See id. at 1238-39. The Arnett court cited to Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544. The
court also considered Willigham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084,
1091-092 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that distinctions between men and women in employment standards based upon something other than immutable characteristics or
legally protected rights do not violate Title VII); Sprogis, 444 F.2d at 1194-98 (holding
that defendant's policy requiring female flight attendants to be unmarried, but not
male attendants violated Title VII); EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 609
n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (noting that employer does not have unfettered discretion to require employees to wear any uniforms the employer chooses where the employer knows
that such outfits subject female employees to sexual harassment); and Valdes v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 507 F. Supp. 10, 11 (S.D. Fla. 1980) (holding that where employers policy against hiring homosexuals was not uniformly applied to male and female employees, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief under Title VII, where it can be
established that the asserted reason is merely pretext for sex discrimination). See
Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1238-39.
145. See id. at 1239.
146. See id. at 1239-40. The Arnett court cited Jeffries, 612 F.2d 1025, 1032 (holding that discrimination against black women could exist in the absence of discrimination against black men'or white women), and Graham v. Bendrix Corp., 585 F. Supp.
1036,1047 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (holding that the duty not to discriminate may be violated
where discrimination is directed at one member of a protected class and not all members); Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1406 (holding that black women can constitute a protected
sub-class under Title VII). [d. See also disCUBBion in Good, 1995 WL 67672 infra notes
205-13 and accompanying text involving an allegation of age and sex discrimination by
an "older woman."
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III. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967
The purposes of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
("the ADEA") are to promote the employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age
discrimination in employment, and to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact
of age on employment. 147 The prohibitive language of the
ADEA was modeled after Title VII.148 Accordingly, courts give
147. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994).
148. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)-(e) (1994). The substantive provisions of the ADEA are
identical to those of Title VII, with the exception of the protected classification. See
supra notes 29,31 for comparison of Title VII's substantive provisions. The prohibitive
provisions in the ADEA state in relevant part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age (emphasis added);
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee because of such individual's age (emphasis added); or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply with
this chapter.
(b) It shall be unlawful for an employment agency to fail or refuse to
refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of such individual's age, or to classify or refer for employment any individual on the basis of such individual's age.
(c) It shall be unlawful for a labor organization(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or to otherwise discriminate against, any individual because of his age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify its membership, or to classify or fail
or refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities, or would limit such employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee or as an applicant for employment, because of such individual's age;
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against
an individual in violation of this section.
(d) It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of
his employees or applicants for employment, for an employment agency
to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization to
discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership,
because of such individual, member or applicant for membership has
opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because such individual, member or applicant for membership has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter.
(e) It shall be unlawful for an employer, labor organization, or employment agency to print or publish, or cause to be printed or published, any notice or advertisement relating to employment by such an
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parallel construction to similar or identical language in both
statutes. 149
Under the ADEA, discrimination against individuals who
are at least forty years of age is prohibited.150 Like Title VII,
the ADEA reaches workplace discrimination by employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations in hiring, promotions, work assignments, compensation, environment, and discharge. 151 A violation of the ADEA can occur when an employer
imposes on workers of one age group requirements or conditions not imposed on other age classes.152

employer or membership in or any classification or referral for employment by such a labor organization, or relating to any classification or
referral for employment by such an employment agency, indicating any
preference, limitation, specification, or discrimination, based on age.

[d.
149. See Western Airlines, Inc. v. Criwsell, 472 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1985) (adopting
the narrow construction of BFOQ from Title VII to the ADEA because of identical language in the substantive provisions of both statutes).
150. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994). ("The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age"). [d.
151. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b).(d) (1994). Under 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994), the term
"employer" under the ADEA is dermes as "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has twenty or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or
more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year." [d.
Under 29 U.S.C. § 630(c) (1994), the term "employment agency" refers to "any person regularly undertaking with or without compensation to procure employees for an
employer and includes an agent of such a person; but shall not include an agency of the
United States." [d.
Under 29 U. S. C. § 623(d) (1994), the term "labor organization" means:
a labor organization engaged in an industry affecting commerce and
any such agent of such an organization, and includes any organization
of any kind, any agency, or employee representation committee, group,
association, or plan so engaged in which employees participate and
which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay,
hours or other terms or conditions of employment, and any conference,
general committee, joint or system board, or joint council so engaged
which is subordinate to a national or international labor organization.

[d.

Exemptions from the ADEA's coverage are provided for foreign persons not controlled by an American employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(h)(2). Elected officials and their
staff members not covered by the civil service laws of the state are also exempt from
the ADEA See 29 U.S.C. § 630(0 (1994).
152. See Shager v. UpJohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990).
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A. THEORIES OF DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ADEA
Both disparate treatment and disparate impact theories of
discrimination can apply to claims asserted under the ADEA.153
As in Title VII, a plaintiff may offer direct evidence, in the form
of verbal or written admissions by the employer to establish
intent to discriminate under the ADEA.154 Even in a mixedmotives case, where an ADEA plaintiffs proof demonstrates
direct evidence of discrimination, she may be awarded declaratory relief and attorney fees. 155 Unless the employer proves
that the same decision would have been made despite the illegitimate motive, the plaintiff may also be awarded other forms
of relief. 156

153. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (disparate treatment
case). The proposition that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADEA is
not an uncontroversial one. In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Hazen Paper Co.
v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), which involved a claim of a discriminatory discharge on
the basis of age by a sixty-two year old employee. Hazen, 507 U.S. at 607. Although
Hazen did not involve a claim of disparate impact under the ADEA, the Court, first in
the majority opinion delivered by Justice O'Connor, then in a special concurrence filed
by Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist and Thomas, explicitly stated that the Court had
"never decided whether a disparate impact theory of liability is available under the
ADEA" and that it did not address the issue in Hazen. See ide at 610, 614, 618. Some
courts and commentators have interpreted the peculiarity of the special concurrence to
represent Court hostility to disparate impact claims under the ADEA. For a discussion
of the decision in Hazen and a review of those Circuit courts that recognize or deny the
application of disparate impact to actions brought under the ADEA, see Jan W. Henkel,
Age Discrimination: Disparate Impact Under the ADEA After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins: Arguments in Favor, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1183 (1997); Jonas Saunders, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act: Disparate Impact Analysis and the Availability of
Liquidated Damages After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 591
(1996).
154. See e.g., Naton v. Bank of California, 649 F.2d 691, 698 (9th Cir. 1981) (statement that plaintiff is "over the bill"); Hodgson v. First Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n of
Broward Fla., 455 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1972) (interview notes stating that the plain.
tiff was "too old").
155. See Miller v. Cigna Corp., 47 F.~d 586, 598, n.10 (3d Cir. 1995) (en banc) (applying amendments to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, modifying employer burdens in
mixed-motives cases and liability under Title VII to the ADEA). See supra notes 50-56
and accompanying text for discussion of how changes to Title VII as a result of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, modify the liability and proof requirements of employers in
mixed-motive cases under Title VII when impermissible discrimination is demonstrated by the use of direct evidence.
156. See id. Comments by employers expressing a general preference for or against
a particular age class that are descriptive, rather than evaluative in nature (such as
noting the ages of employees under review) or that are remote in time or connection to
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As under Title VII, the McDonnell-Douglas-based model and

its progeny apply in ADEA cases to establish a prima facie
case. 157 In those cases where a plaintiff utilizes the McDonnellDouglas framework, she must establish: membership in the
protected age group, that she was qualified for the position and
was discharged or otherwise discriminated against despite her
qualifications, and the position remained open for applications
from individual's with the plaintiffs same qualifications.158
Once the plaintiff establishes the prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the employer to articulate a "legitimate, non-discriminatory reason" for the employment
decision. 159 The burden is only a burden of producing a reason,
from which the court may infer that the employer did not discriminate. l60 If the defendant fails, a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff may be entered.l61 However, the presumption of intent
to discriminate is destroyed once the employer comes forth with
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the decision.162 The
ultimate burden shifts back to the plaintiff, as a burden of persuasion. l63 The plaintiff must prove to the trier of fact that the
employer's explanation is a pretext for its discriminatory motive. l64 As with Title VII, the burden of persuasion of the employer's motive rests at all times with the plaintiff under the
ADEA and if the plaintiff fails to convince the trier of fact, a
judgment for defendant is entered. l65

the challenged employment action, have been held not to conclusively establish direct
evidence of age bias by the employer. See, e.g., Shager, 913 F.2d at 402.
157. See McDonnell.Douglas, 411 U.S. 792. See, e.g., Hazen, 507 U.S. at 612; Miller
47 F.3d at 598 n. 10. Even though the McDonnell-Douglas test is a standard framework for proving discrimination, some courts have held that age discrimination suits
should be decided on a case by case basis without rigid adherence to McDonnellDouglas. See e.g., McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1161 (6th Cir. 1990).
158. McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Under the ADEA, the plaintiff must be
at least forty years of age. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994).
159. See McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
160. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
161. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
164. See id.
165. See supra note 68 and accompanying text..
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Several statutory defenses are available to counter a charge
of age discrimination. They include the use of a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") defense under which an employer may lawfully take age into account.166 To establish a
BFOQ, an employer must prove that it is "reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of the particular business. "167 Employers may also defend against a claim of age discrimination by
demonstrating that a bona fide employment benefits plan, or
seniority system is in place. 168 Additionally, employers may
affirmatively defend against a claim of age discrimination by
showing that the action taken is "based upon reasonable factors other than age. "169 A "reasonable factor" is one that must
not present any considerations of age.170
B. MULTI-FACTOR DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER THE ADEA:
"AGE-PLUS" OTHER FACTOR CLAIMS GENERALLY HELD NOT
VALID UNDER THE ADEA
Several courts have explicitly addressed the issue of
whether age, in addition to another characteristic, or "age-plus"
discrimination exists under the ADEA. Those courts flatly reject the proposition that an "age-plus" cause of action is valid
under the ADEA.
In Kelly v. Drexel University, for example, a former employee of Drexel University ("University") alleged discrimination on the basis of his combined age and disability in the University's decision to terminate him during a reduction in
workforce. l7l At the time of the discharge, plaintiff, Francis

166. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (0(1) (1994).
167. ld.
168. See 29 U.S.C. § 623 (0(2) (1994).
169. 29 U.S.C. § 623 ( 0(1) (1994).
170. See id. "Reasonable factors other than age" include uniformly required credentials such as education, prior experience, and employment policies that measure
merit or the quality or quantity of performance. Those not meeting the standards may
be discharged "for good cause" regardless of their age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(3) (1994).
171. 907 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1995). The decision in Kelly was rendered by the
same district court judge that issued the opinion in Arnett v. ARpin., 846 F. Supp. 1234
(E. D. Pa. 1994). Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 869. Plaintiff brought actions under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 - 12213, and its state counterpart, Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act, 43 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 951-963. Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 869. The
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Kelly, was sixty-eight years old.172 Kelly worked in the University's purchasing department as Senior Buyer for twelve
years. 173 Kelly's employment began in 1981 when he was fiftysix years old. 174
As proof of age discrimination, Kelly relied on a conversation with his supervisor in which he was asked when he intended to retire. 175 Kelly also presented a letter he received
from the University shortly after his termination, referring to
Kelly as a "retiree."176

The district court considered the supervisor's question regarding Kelly's intent to retire. 177 The Court noted that the
question arose within the context of a conversation regarding
Kelly's son and his recent graduation from college and how that
would affect Kelly's decision to retire. 178 Under those circumstances, the Kelly court concluded that the statement did not
demonstrate any age-related animus.179 With respect to the
letter, the University's policy defined a former employee over
fifty-five with ten or more years of service as a ~etiree entitled
to retirement benefits. 1so The court found that the University's
policy did not provide a sufficient inference of discrimination
against Kelly since his employment at the University did not
commence until he was fifty_six. 1s1

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 [hereinafter "ADA"], at section 12112(a) provides that:
No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with
a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharges of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
[d.
172. See Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 869.
173. See id. at 869. The ages of the two other buyer employees in the department
who retained their positions were flfty-four and forty-six. Plaintiffs supervisor was
aged flfty. [d. at 869-870.
174. Seeid. at 869.
175. See id. at 872.
176. See Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 872.
177. See id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 872.
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Kelly's proof of disability discrimination consisted of circumstantial evidence that included expert testimony regarding
the role of stereotypes about disabled persons in employment
decisions. 182 Kelly argued that the court could infer intent to
discriminate as a result of possible stereotypical assumptions
as to Kelly's ability to effectively perform his position because
the employer was aware that Kelly walked with a limp.l83
The district court granted the University's motion for summary judgment on both the age and disability claims.l84 The
district court concluded that there was no evidence of age bias
and that Kelly's injury did not meet the definition of a disability under the ADA. I85 In a footnote to the opinion, the Court
addressed Kelly's contention that his "age-plus-disability" created a protected subclass of older workers with disabilities for
analysis of his claims. l86 Although the district court agreed
that subclass discrimination against a subclass of protected
workers is cognizable under Title VII, it concluded that the
doctrine applies only when the allegation involves sex plus
some other form of discrimination.187 The court resolved its
prior decision in Arnett v. Aspin with its reasoning in Kelly
when Judge Reed clarified that the decision in Arnett recognized a claim of combined age and sex discrimination as "sexplus" discrimination under Title VII, not "age-plus" discrimination under the ADEA. 188 In Kelly, Judge Reed stated that he

182. See id. at 871.
183. See id. Plaintiffs limp was caused by a hip injury in 1987. The condition was
diagnosed as severe post-traumatic degenerative joint disease of his right hip. See id.
at 870. Plaintiffs argument suggested that given the widespread stereotyped perceptions of disabled persons in society, knowledge of a physical impairment alone, was
sufficient to raise an inference that impermissible discrimination based upon stereotyped assumptions about persons with disabilities existed in Kelly's claim. See id. at
871-72.
184. See Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 878. Summary judgment is a judgment granted on a
claim about which there is no genuine issue of material fact and upon which the party
seeking summary judgment is entitled to prevail as a' matter of law. This allows a
speedy disposition of a controversy without the need for trial. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
185. See Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 873-74. The court determined that plaintiffs hip
and subsequent difficulty walking did not constitute a "substantial limitation" on his
ability to walk within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) and its regulations, at 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(g). See Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 874.
186. See id. at 875 fn.8.
187. See id.
188. See id.
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found no authority for an "age-plus" discrimination claim under
the ADEA, while ample precedent for "sex-plus" claims
existed. 1s9 Accordingly, Judge Reed held that Kelly's claim for
discrimination as a result of membership in a subclass of older
workers was not cognizable under the ADEAl90
Similarly, in Luce v. Dalton, the District Court for the
Southern District of California addressed the viability of "ageplus" claims, alleging age-pIus-disability and age-pIus-religion
discrimination. 191 Luce's termination from his position with the
Navy's Meteorology Engineering Centers occurred in 1982.192
At the time Luce commenced his action in 1993, the separate
claims of disability and religious discrimination were time
barred. 193 Luce moved for leave to amend his complaint alleging age discrimination to include allegations of "age-plusreligion" and "age-pIus-disability" discrimination.l94 The Appellate Court, after considering Luce's arguments on the exis~
tence of a viable "age-plus" theory, held that both claims were
unsupported by Luce's argument. 195

189. See Kelly, 907 F. Supp. at 875 fn.8.
190. See id.
191. See 166 F.R.D. 457 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
192. See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 462.
193. See id. Plaintiff had improperly filed an appeal of his termination to the U.S.
Merit System Protection Board, claiming age discrimination without first exhausting
all administrative remedies within the U.S. Navy. The complaint was subsequently
dismissed for lack ofjurisdidion. In 1987, plaintiff retained counsel and filed an action
for age discrimination in the present court which was again dismissed and remanded to
the U.S. Navy EEO officer in 1990 for investigation and determination. In 1993, the
Navy's EEO officer dismissed plaintiffs complaint for lack of jurisdiction and shortly
thereafter, plaintiff instituted this proceeding, pro se, alleging violations of the ADEA,
and religious discrimination, under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The court dismissed plaintiffs
religious discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, as pre-empted by provisions of
Title VII, without leave to amend because the claim was then time barred. See Luce,
166 F.R.D. at 462. Moreover, plaintiff conceded that his disability discrimination
claim, standing alone, would not satisfy the definition of disability within the meaning
of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 459.
194. See id. at 458. Because the age discrimination claim was not time barred,
plaintiff may have believed his allegation of "age-plus" disability and religion were
theoretically cognizable as arising out of the age discrimination under the ADEA See
id.
195. See id. at 461. Plaintiff cited only one secondary source, ERNEST C. HADLEY, A
GUIDE TO FEDERAL SECTOR EQUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW & PRACTICE 750 (1995 Ed.), for
the proposition that being over forty and a member of a Title VII class may state a
cause of action for discrimination in support of his Mage_plus" claim. See id.
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In determining that an "age-plus" claim was not possible
under the ADEA, the district court considered the sex-plus theory available under Title VII, as articulated in Phillips, Jeffries, Hicks, and Lam. 196 According to the Luce court, the explicit language relied upon by courts interpreting Title VII's
bar against race, sex, national origin, or religion as inclusive to
all forms of discrimination under its provisions could not be
extended to support an "age-plus" theory of discrimination.197
The court reasoned that unlike Title VII, no argument exists
that Congress intended to include any group for protection,
other than age in any of the provisions of the ADEA. 198 The
Luce court explained that courts supporting an expansive view
of Title VII's protections have relied upon the language of Title
VII protecting multiple groups, such as race, religion, sex, and
national origin simultaneously to argue that multi-factor discrimination is both prohibited and cognizable under Title
VII. 199 In contrast, the ADEA provides but one classification
for protections under its provisions.200 The Luce court held that

196. Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 459-60. See Phillips, 400 U.S. 542, supra notes 103-06 and
accompanying text; Jeffries, 615 F.2d 1025, supra notes 107-11 and accompanying
text; Hicks, 833 F.2d 1406, infra notes 309-19 and accompanying text; Lam, 40 F.3d
1551, supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
197. See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 461.
198. See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 459-61. The Luce court considered the reasoning in
Jeffries wherein the Jeffries court noted that Congress placed the word "or!' in between
the prohibitive provisions ofrace, color, religion, sex and national origin in Title VII as
evidence of its intent to cover each classification inclusively. See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at
459-60, citing Jeffries, 615 F.2d at 1032. The Luce court also cited to Hicks, 833 F.2d at
1416, applying Jeffries reasoning to hold that a black female plaintiff could aggregate
the evidence ofrace and sex discrimination in her claim. See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 46061.
199. See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 459-61, discussing the opinion in Jeffries, Hicks, Lam.
See supra note 196 for case cites. Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1994), the relevant
language in Title VII reads, "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions and privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin . ..(emphasis added)." [d.
200. The text of the ADEA reads in relevant part, "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions and privileges of employment because of such individual's age (emphasis added)." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994). See also supra notes 148-51 for other
substantive provisions under the ADEA
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recognition of "age-plus-religion" or "age-plus-disability" as an
extension of "sex-plus" would amount tojudiciallegislation.201
Moreover, in reaching its decision, the court considered the
opinions in Arnett and Kelly involving combination of age with
other factors in a "plus" theory.202 The Luce court noted that
Arnett explicitly recognized that "sex-plus-age" discrimination
is available under Title VII and not the ADEA.203 Furthermore,
the Luce court considered that the court in Kelly determined
that no authority to recognize "age-plus-disability" discrimination exists under the ADEA. 204
Both Luce and Kelly explicitly reject the notions that an
"age-plus" model of discrimination is available under the provisions of the ADEA. Therefore, plaintiffs with hybrid or multifactor discrimination claims encompassing age, obtain incomplete relief under the ADEA alone. Some commentators have
read the decision of an Oregon district court judge in Good v.
United States West Communications Inc. to authorize an "ageplus" model to allege discrimination on the basis of age and sex
under the ADEA. 205 The next section analyzes the likelihood
that Good's holding recognizes as cognizable an "age-plus"
claim under the ADEA.
1. Good v. United States West Communications, Inc.: The
Implications For An "Age-plus" Claim

In Good v. United States West Communications, Inc., an
Oregon district court reinstated the age discrimination claim
under the ADEA of a forty-five year old former employee of
West Communications.206 The plaintiff, Good, alleged a dis-

201. See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 461.
202. See id. at 460. See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. 1234, 1240; Kelly, 907 F. Supp. 864,
875 n.8.
203. See Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 460, citing Arnett, 864 F. Supp. at 1240.
204. Luce, 166 F.R.D. at 460. See discussion of Kelly, supra notes 171-90 and accompanying text.
205. See Mary E. Powell, Comment, The Claims Of Women of Color Under Title VII:
The Interaction of Race and Genckr, 26 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REV., 413, 434-36 (1996).
See also, WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 17 (arguing that theoretically Good's claim
could be brought as Mage-plus" under the ADEA).
206. See No. 93-302-FR, 1995 WL 67672 (D. Or. Feb. 16, 1995).
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criminatory termination on the basis of her age and sex.207 In
the proceeding below, the Magistrate Judge granted defendant's motion for summary judgement on Good's age, but not
sex claim holding that the age difference of two and one-half
years between Good and her replacement was legally insufficient to establish that she was replaced by a substantially
younger individua1.208
Good moved for reconsideration and reinstatement of her
age claim by arguing that her replacement by a "younger man"
was sufficient to create an issue of fact as to whether she was
discriminated against on the basis of her combined age as well
as sex status. 209 On reconsideration, the district held that
Good's age claim should be reinstated where Good could demonstrate that the combination of her age and sex resulted in
her termination.210
In its one page opinion, the Good court reached its decision
to reinstate Good's age discrimination claim by relying on the
recent decision in Lam v. University of Hawaii as authority.211
Lam was analyzed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit as a combined race and sex allegation under Title VII.212 It
is arguable that Good is the first case to recognize that an "ageplus" theory of liability is cognizable under the ADEA. However, because the Good court's opinion relied on the "sex-plus"
theory applied in Lam to hold that Good should be allowed to
demonstrate that the combination of her age and sex played a
role in her treatment, the opinion in Good supports the conclusion that the court used a "sex-plus," rather than establishing
an "age-plus" rational to resolve Good's claim.213

207. See Good, 1995 WL 67672 at *1.
208. See id. Good's replacement was a forty-two year old male. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See Good, 1995 WL 67672 at *1. See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1551. For a discussion of
Lam, supra notes 112-18 and accompanying text.
212. See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1561-52.
213. It might be more accurately stated that the decision in Good, rather than Ar·
nett was then first to recognize that "sex-plus-age" discrimination is cognizable as "sexplus" discrimination under Title VII since Good was decided before Arnett.
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The effect of Good on establishing a valid "age-plus" doctrine .is currently speculative since the court did not explicitly
address the issue. However, the reasoning applied to both Lam
and Good's claims: that where multi-factor discrimination is
alleged, a plaintiff should be allowed to demonstrate that the
combination of factors resulted in discriminatory treatment
which should be adopted to resolve "age-plus-sex" discrimination claims under the ADEA, as well as Title VII. However,
courts like Kelly and Luce that have explicitly addressed the
viability of "age-plus" factors other than sex under the ADEA
have responded negatively to the claims.
IV. TREATMENT OF HYBRID DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
BY COURTS: THE SEPARATE ANALYTICAL MODEL AND
ITS NEGATIVE IMPACT ON HYBRID AGE AND SEX
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Compounding the problems created by hybrid discrimination when courts do not accept older women as a protected subclass under Title VII, thereby causing courts to refuse to con. sider any multi-factor discrimination claims under the ADEA,
is court treatment of hybrid age and sex discrimination once an
allegation of discrimination under the ADEA and Title VII is
advanced. Courts use a separate analytical model ("separate
basis approach") to analyze age and sex claims as separate and
distinct causes of action, even if the pleading suggests hybrid
discrimination. 214
Pleading hybrid sex and age discrimination claims can take
one of several forms. First, a plaintiff may make explicit references to discrimination as specifically directed at "older women
or females," with supporting proof.215 This model may be
adopted where disparate treatment or impact against older

214. See Davis v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. R. Co., 803 F.2d 1322
(4th Cir. 1986); WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 19-21. See, e.g., Murdock, 1992 WL
39318; Thompson, 674 F. Supp. 198,203-04; Sharnhorst, 686 F. 2d 637.
215. See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 12-13. See e.g., Dugan v. Pennsylvania
Miller Mut. Ins. Co., 871 F. Supp. 785 (M.D. Pa. 1994), affd 68 F.3d 456 (3d Cir. 1995);
Blonder v. Evanston Hosp. Corp., No. 91-C-3846, 1992 WL 44404 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Rielly v. Prudential Prop. & Casualty Ins. Co., 653 F. Supp. 725 (D.N.J. 1987).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol28/iss2/2

42

Crocette: Hybrid Sex and Age Discrimination

1998]

HYBRID SEX AND AGE DISCRIMINATION

157

women is present, but general age or sex bias is not. A second
pleading form for hybrid discrimination claims may adopt the
"sex-plus" model, by arguing that older women are a protected
subclass under Title VII, in conjunction with the proof of discrimination directed at older women as "older women. 71216
Third, a hybrid discrimination claim may allege discrimination
as a result of age, under the ADEA and sex under Title VII,
and present evidence of disparate treatment against plaintiff
on the basis of both, in conjunction with evidence of a general
atmosphere of sex and age bias.217
A separate basis approach to analyzing the evidence of age
and sex discrimination requires a plaintiff to prove that discrimination occurred on the basis of age or sex, independent of
one another.218 Under a separate basis approach, a court allocates the evidence applicable to the age and sex claims into individual categories.219 This approach does not provide adequate protections for litigants with hybrid discrimination
claims because the approach fails to recognize the interrelatedness of the evidence of age and sex bias, or how each
piece of evidence of age discrimination may support the sex discrimination claim under the circumstances presented in the
claim. Saes v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. illustrates this
potential. 220 In Saes, Alice Saes sued her former employer,
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. ("Manufacturers Hanover"),
for age and sex discrimination in its termination decisions
during a reduction in the workforce.221 Manufacturers Hanover
terminated Saes, four other women, and two men from their

216. See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 16-18. See e.g., Arnett, 846 F. Supp. 1234;
Soggs, 603 N.Y.S.2d 21; Palmero, 809 F. Supp. 341; Comway, 825 F.2d 593.
217. See, WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 30-31. See e.g., Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced
Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1991); Rollins v. TechSouth Inc., 833 .
F.2d 1525 (11th Cir. 1987).
218. See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 19. Courts can also analyze combined sex
and age discrimination claims under a protected subclass model and a hybrid, or multidiscrimination approach. For a discussion of the protected subclass approach, see id. at
16-19, and notes 119-46 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the hybrid approach used by courts, see id., at 21-22, and infra notes 276-319 and accompanying

text.
219. See id. at 19.
220. No. 90-0536, 1991 U S Diat. Lexis 14634 (S.D. N.Y. Oct. 11,1991).
221. See Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at * 1 -2.
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positions as underwriters, but retained three substantially
younger males in the remaining positions.222
At the time of her termination, Saes was fifty-five years old
and had been employed in various capacities with Manufacturers Hanover for thirty-nine years.223 Of the six other employees
dismissed, four were over the age of forty.224 The district court
for the Southern District of New York granted Manufacturers
Hanover's motion for summary judgment on the sex claim, but
not the age discrimination claim.225 The district court considered each cause of action individually and allocated the evidence separately to analyze the strength of each of Saes'
claims. 226
For the sex discrimination claim, the court considered a
memo prepared by' the head of Saes' former department that
noted the sex of each employee to be terminated.227 Saes also
alleged "various acts of discrimination" in which female employees were not invited to intra-departmental meetings of
bank officers.228 Saes also demonstrated that the five female
underwriters that were terminated represented the entire
number of women employed in the department.229 Relying on
this evidence, the court held Saes' allegations were insufficient
to establish a claim of sex discrimination.230 The court then
dismissed Saes' sex discrimination claim.231

222. See id. at * 2.
223. See id. at *1-2. Saes began her employment in 1949. From 1985, until the
time of her separation from the company, Saes worked as an underwriter in the banks
Hicksville, New York facility. The court did not specify what other positions Saes held
within the bank prior to 1985. See id. at *1.
224. See Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at *2.
225. See id. at *5-6.
226. See id. at *6-11.
227. See id. at *6-7. The notations were "b" for "boy" and .g" for "girl" pencilled in
besides the last names of the underwriters. Manufacturers Hanover claimed that the
notations were added after it made the termination decisions, in order to comply with
federal regulations requiring the personnel department to provide an analysis for discrimination purposes. See id. at *7.
228. See Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at *7.
229. See id.
230. See id. at *7-8.
231. See id. at *17.
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In analyzing Saes' evidence of sex bias, the court noted that
Saes did not provide evidence on the sex composition of the
other two thousand bank employees that were terminated from
other departments during the reduction in workforce.232
Moreover, in rebutting Saes' prima facie showing of sex discrimination, the district court relied on evidence that within a
month of Saes' termination, the bank rehired a younger female
underwriter.233 The court also considered that, a year later,
Manufacturers Hanover hired another younger woman as an
underwriter.234
The court concluded that Manufacturers
Hanover did not discriminate on the basis of sex because it
hired these other women.235 The Saes court did not specify the
ages of the other terminated female underwriters in its opinion, but simply stated that of the six terminated employees
"four were over forty. JJ236 The significance of the information to
Saes in creating an inference of bias against her as an older
woman, rather than bias against women in general was significant, particularly because the underwriters retained by Manufacturers Hanover following the reduction were all men, age
thirty-nine, forty-two, and forty-eight. 237 Yet, the court failed to
consider how the sexes of the other terminated underwriters
over forty, impacted Saes' sex discrimination claim, particularly if all four of the other females underwriters were forty or
older.238

Next, the district court separately analyzed Saes' age
claim.239 The court considered the termination of a disproportionate number of employees over the age of forty in the underwriter's groUp.240 Moreover, the court noted, but did not

232. See id. at *8.
233. Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at *8. The woman rehired was forty at the
time of her dismissal and subsequent rehire. See id. at n.3.
234. [d. at *8. The new hire was twenty-eight years old at the commencement of
her emploYment. See id.
235. See id. at *8-9.
236. See id. at *2.
237. See Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at *2.
238. The evidence in the opinion showed that Saes and at least one of the other
women terminated during the employee reductions was at least forty at the time they
were dismissed. See id. at *8 n. 3. See supra note 233.
239. See id. at *10-11.
240. See id. at *10.
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factor into its determination the memorandum prepared for the
personnel department listing the age of each employee considered for discharge or retention.241 The district court also relied
on the alleged statement by the personnel manager that the
reason for Saes' termination was her age.242 Additionally, the
court cited the ages of new hires it had previously used to rebut
Saes' sex discrimination claim in analyzing the age claim.243
The court also considered that Saes' had thirty-nine years of
experience with Manufacturers Hanover and that her qualifications and expertise surpassed all of the male retained underwriters who were substantially younger than Saes.244 The
court concluded that this evidence raised an inference of age
discrimination sufficient to survive summary judgment.245
Thus, the court sustained Saes' age discrimination claim.246
With the exception of the contested statement by the personnel manager that Saes' termination occurred because of her
age, the evidence for both Saes' age and sex claims was nearly
identical.247 Saes was much older than both the male retained
underwriter employees and every female and male hire.24s The
contested statement that Saes' firing occurred because of her
age could easily be interpreted as a statement that Saes, as an
"older woman," rather than simply an older employee was terminated because of her age, given the supporting inferences of
other proof. For example, Saes demonstrated that within a
month of her termination, Manufacturers Hanover rehired one
of the terminated female underwriters who was forty at the
time of her dismissal and rehire. 249 All of the retained male

241. See Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at *10. The court gave no weight to
this evidence because of defendant's proffered reason for maintaining such records that

it discussed in ruling on the sex claim. See id. at *11 n. 5. See also supra note 227 for:
the employer's explanation.
242. See id. at *10.
243. See id. at *10. In addition to the allegations involving the two younger
women, the court also considered a third allegation, involving a younger male of thirtytwo at the time of his hire. See id.
244. See Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at *14.
245. See id. at *16.
246. See id. at *18.
247. See id. at *6-11.
248. See id. at *2, 8.
249. See Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at *2, 9-10 n ..a.
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underwriters were significantly younger than Saes.250 Moreover, all of the subsequent hires of both genders were substantially younger and had much less experience than Saes.251
The court did not consider how the combination of the ages
and sexes of the terminated employees as compared to the retained and new hire employees might support Saes' combined
age and sex discrimination claim. Though the court was willing to narrow the question of age bias to the underwriter positions, it refused to do so for the sex claim.252 Further, while the
court considered Saes' thirty-nine years of experience with
Manufacturer's Hanover and superior credentials as compared
to the younger retained and newly hired employees, it did not
use the same analysis in considering the sexes, in conjunction
with the ages of those employees.253
An argument can be made that Saes' evidence raised an inference of hybrid sex and age discrimination against her as an
older woman in the reduction decisions sufficient to survive
summary adjudication. However, unless courts have a flexible
approach to use in analyzing the evidence of hybrid sex and age
discrimination, overlaps in the evidence can be overlooked.

Applying a separate basis approach to consider the evidence
of discrimination, no matter how much it suggests hybrid discrimination, necessarily limits a court's attention to an analysis based solely upon the categories to which the evidence is
placed and supports a rigid analytical structure that is inappropriate for hybrid claims. Moreover, an older woman's efforts to obtain complete redress for hybrid discrimination is
harmed when a separate analytical model is used because this

250. See id. at *2.
251. See id. at *10, 14. Though the court did not compare Saes' experience and credentials to that of the other female rehire and new hire. However, it is reasonable to
assume that neither the forty, nor the twenty-nine year old had comparable experience
or expertise as Saes since Saes had thirty-nine years of experience. See id.
252. See id. at *8. See supra note 231 and accompanying text wherein the court required proof of the sex composition of the two thousand other bank employees terminated in the workforce reduction. See id.
253. See Saes, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14634 at notes 239-46 and accompanying text
for recap of analysis the court used in separately analyzing Saes sex and age discrimination claims.
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approach repeatedly ignores the inter-relatedness of the claims
and can allow a defendant to obtain a summary judgment simply by showing how younger women and older men are not
subject to the adverse treatment.2M
White men alleging discrimination on the basis of their
status as "white males" illustrate the incompatibility of a separate analytical model for hybrid discrimination claims.255
Those claims have not been subjected to the bifurcated analytical framework that other "sex-plus" claims experience, nor
have they been resolved on summary judgment for lack of evidence of sex discrimination against men of color, or race discrimination against white women.256 As ineffective as evidence
of discrimination directed at men of color and white females
would be to providing redress for claims of discrimination by
white males as "white males," so too is the evidence of discrimination against older male employees or younger women to
resolve the claims of discrimination by older women. Because
neither category of evidence involving persons outside of the
plaintiff's class (i.e. race, sex, or age) directly addresses discrimination against plaintiff, it should not be summoned in
order to defeat a showing of discriminatory treatment directed
at the plaintiff as an older woman. A separate analytical model
applied to hybrid discrimination suits is not only inappropriate
to resolve those claims, but may also create a negative impact
by allowing evidence of treatment of persons who are not similarly situated to the older woman to defeat her hybrid claims.
Courts may be unaware of how to weigh the evidence of age
and sex discrimination against older women as "older
women. m!57 Or, as in Saes, use· of a separate basis approach
may prevent a court from considering how each piece of evidence of age discrimination supports the sex discrimination
claim and vice versa. In either case, the failure to apply an
analytical model that examines the inter-relatedness of age
and sex discrimination has resulted in court treatment that

254.
255.
256.
257.

See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 20.
See Lam, 40 F.3d at 1562, fn. 19 for similar observations made by the court.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301 (11th eir. 1991).
See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2 at 34.
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does not adequately resolve the particular experience with hybrid discrimination that older women face.
V. CRITIQUE

A. How LAWYERS CAN INEFFECTUALLY TREAT HYBRID OR DUAL
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS

The ability of older women to obtain adequate redress for
claims of discrimination is also significantly hampered by the
failure of their attorneys to investigate the potential of combination discrimination.25s An attorney may assume that the
treatment an older female employee receives is largely the result of her age or sex, rather than her combined status as an
"older woman. "'259 As a consequence, lawyers may wholly ignore the potentially stronger claims of hybrid age and sex discrimination or discrimination against older women that are
available on the facts underlying the plaintiffs claim, than a
pure age or sex discrimination claim alone.260
For instance, in one case, a sixty year woman alleged discriminatory treatment by her employer consisting of statements made by her supervisor that "women over 55 should not
be working", in conjunction with conduct alleged to be directed
only at "older ladies," as well as evidence of general age bias?61
The claim, however, was brought as pure age discrimination
under the ADEA. 262 Other claims may present evidence of discrimination against older women that implicates both sex and
age bias, such as comments that an older woman is a "battle
ax" , "old war horse" " "old hag" "Grandma", "little old lady" ,
"witch", "Old Maid", "old prune", and so on; while these claims
may be presented as pure sex discrimination. Attorneys must
be cognizant of the potential that more than simply age or sex
258. See id. (noting that plaintift's attorneys have a particular opportunity to educate courts about hybrid discrimination against mid-life to older women).
259. See id. The WLDF STUDY points out that some lawyers may lack an understanding of how age and sex are connected for older women in limiting job opportunities. See id.
260. See id. at 34.
261. See Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 832 (6th Cir. 1996).
262. See Crawford, 96 F.3d at 832.
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discrimination is involved in an older woman's discrimination
claims in order to fully develop the evidence supporting a hybrid of age and sex discrimination where it exists.263 The benefits derived from such potential evidence are that it may provide a stronger claim than that of age or sex discrimination
standing alone because it better supports the evidence of discrimination directed against an older woman, than evidence of
pure age or sex discrimination can. Attorneys dealing with
cases presenting evidence of the potential that both age and sex
discrimination are involved in an older woman's claims must
fully explore the potential that a hybrid of both exists before
deciding to plead age or sex discrimination alone.264
B. THE MURDOCK AND THOMPSON DECISIONS . DENYING
RECOGNITION OF OLDER WOMEN AS A PROTECTED SUBCLASS
UNDER TITLE VII AND THE FALLACY OF ADEQUATE SEPARATE
PROTECTIONS FOR HYBRID DISCRIMINATION UNDER EITHER
TITLE VII OR THE ADEA.

The decisions in both Thompson and Murdock expressly refuse to recognize older women as a protected subclass for protection under Title VII or the ADEA, explaining that neither
federal, nor state law has extended protection to older women
as "older women.n265 However, in relying on the lack of immediate precedent for recognizing subset discrimination directed
at older women, neither court actually analyzed the reasoning
applicable to subset discrimination in order to determine
whether or not that reasoning should be applied to those
claims.
Subset discrimination under Title VII, as first identified in
Martin Marietta Corp., v. Phillips, involves allegations that an
employer disparately treats a subclass within a protected class,
rather than the protected class as a whole.266 Accordingly,

263. See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2 at 34.
264. See id.
265. See Thompson, 674 F. Supp. at 203-04; Murdock, 1992 WL 393158 at *3.
266. See Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544 (wherein the U.S. Supreme Court vacated summary judgment in favor of defendants and held that although not all women were affected by the employer's practice of refusing to hire women with pre-school age chil-
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where "a Title VII plaintiff can show that she would have been
offered the position if she were a man, she can show a prima
facie case of discrimination, even if other women were offered
the same position" (emphasis added).267 In Phillips, the "other
women" offered such positions were not be similarly situated to
plaintiff's alleging the disparate treatment in terms of their sex
plus another characteristic being affected by the employer's
practice. 268 In determining whether there is a violation of Title
VII, the plaintiff's class is defined as a "subclass of women (or
men) [that are subjected to disparate treatment] based on either (1) an immutable characteristic or (2) the exercise of a
fundamental right. ~69
Older women are clearly a subset of women within the protected class of "sex" under Title VII, and a subset of older employees within the protected class of "age" under the ADEA
who are subjected to disparate treatment based upon their
combined or hybrid identity as "older women." Accordingly,
where an older woman can show that she would have been offered a position if she were a man, she can show a prima facie
case of discrimination, even if other women were offered the
same position. This reasoning, applied here to "sex-plus-age"
discrimination claims, is a major component of the theoretical
underpinnings in the subset or "sex-plus" discrimination context. There is no salient justification for denying the application of subset discrimination to claims by older women as
"older women" under Title VII since the reasoning underlying
those claims is applicable in a "sex-plus-age" context.
Moreover, an immutability argument is present under both
Title VII and the ADEA for older women's status as "older
women" that is comparable, albeit different in origin, to the

dren, plaintiffs could still establish a violation of Title VII because similarly situated
men were not disparately treated). See id.
267. See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 239.
268. See Phillips, 400 U.S. at 543-44, (noting that although over 70% of applicants
hired for the position at issue were women, plaintiffs could still state a claims for discrimination under Title VII). See id. The women hired were not similarly situated to
the plaintiffs in Phillips because they did not have pre-school age children. See id.
269. Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1238-40, explaining the rule that has emerged from
Phillips and its progeny in analyzing "sex-plus· discrimination claims. See id.
.
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existence of an immutable identity for women of color recognized under Title VII. 270 In an allegation of employment discrimination brought by an African-American woman based
upon her status as a "black woman," courts have recognized
that both components of a black woman's identity are immutable, and therefore create a subset of both Mrican-American and
female employees for protection under Title VII.271 Similarly,
an older woman's gender identity is clearly immutable and
therefore not subject to change. However, an older woman's
status as an "older woman" under both Title VII and the ADEA
is an immutable identity that is not subject to change because
once a woman reaches forty years of age, she becomes protected
by the provisions of the ADEA for the rest of her life. Therefore, whether an older woman is forty or eighty years of age,
she will always be protected under the ADEA, and the protections afforded to her under Title VII because of her gender,
likewise, are not subject to change. The immutability in an
older woman's identity as an older woman not only strengthens
the argument for the extension of "sex-plus" under Title VII to
claims brought by older women, but moreover, provides support
for the proposition that an "age-plus" theory is cognizable under the ADEA.
As distinguished from the claims in Kelly and Luce seeking

recognition of "age-plus-disability" and "age-plus religion" discrimination, an older woman's identity as an "older woman" is
legally created by her admission into the protected group under
the ADEA and cannot arise before she reaches forty.272 As a
result, an older woman's status as an older woman in an employment context is both defmed and solidified by her entrance
into the protected age group under the ADEA. On the other
hand, the development of a disability or a religious belief can

270. See supra notes 107-18 discussing "sex-plus" discrimination claims of women
of color. See also supra note 15 for articles 'on the subject of combined race and sex
discrimination.
271. See Jeffries, 615 F.2d at 1032-33; supra notes 108-11, holding that black
women could establish a discrimination claim absent discrimination against black men
or white women.
272. The ADEA protects persons who are forty or older. See 42 U.S.C. § 631(a)
(1994).
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theoretically occur at any time in a plaintiffs employment.273
The ADEA should therefore expand its protections to cover
older women as "older women" since her status is "born" or
arises out of her inclusion in the protected classification under
theADEA.
The opinions in Thompson and Murdock expressed reservations about considering older women as a protected subclass for
Title VII or the ADEA purposes because no authority existed
upon which to fmd that a viable age "age-plus-sex" theory exists, and the court in Murdock concluded that judicial attempts
to establish such a theory would amount to judicial
legislation. 274 But the problem of inadequate remedy for "specialized" forms of discrimination has been faced by other courts
at one time or another. Those courts used the underlying rationales in Title VII or the ADEA to support new applications
of existing theories in order to meet the needs of significant
subsets of women and men whose claims of discrimination were
not being adequately redressed by the then current structures
available.275 Similarly, Title VII and the ADEA must continue
to evolve and expand in order to meet the needs of persons protected by its provisions that experience subset discrimination
on multiple basis, rather than just because of their age or sex.
The rationales supporting the existence of the "sex-plus" doctrine also support its further extension to "age-plus-sex" discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA. Accordingly, courts
273. Generally there is a much stronger correlation between age and disability than
age plus religion or other factors where degenerative conditions increase with a person's age. See, e.g., Blonder, 1992 WL 44404 (discussing age and sex discrimination
claims brought by an older woman on the basis of an employer practice that required
the largely female nursing staff, but not the largely male physician staff to undergo
rubella inoculations and the relationship between inoculations and arthritic conditions
that are triggered by the vaccinations in adult women that increase with their ages).
The correlation between age and an age-related disability however, does not arise out
of admittance into the protected age group to the same extent that one's status as an
older woman does. This argument is not put forth here to argue that a claim for ageplus-disability should not cognizable under the ADEA, but only to illustrate the differences in such claims.
274. See Thompson, 674 F. Supp. at 203-04; MuTYkJek, 1992 WL 393158 at *3.
275. See e.g., Rogers, 454 F.2d 234, supra note 92 (establishing hostile environment
claim by utilizing the "terms, conditions and privileges language" in Title VI!); Jeffries,
615 F.2d 1032 supra note 108-11 and accompanying text (first holding that black
women could establish a claim under Titile VII for discrimination absent discriminatory treatment directed at white females or males of color).
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should apply that reasoning to sex-pIus-age discrimination
claims under either statute.
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Judges and attorneys can consistently recognize the potential for hybrid discrimination in the claims brought by older
women by considering the ways in which the evidence of discrimination may support a hybrid of both age and sex. The
following section discusses approaches that courts and attorneys should adopt in analyzing and presenting hybrid discrimination claims.
A. COURTS SHOULD USE A HYBRID APPROACH TO ANALYZE
HYBRID AGE AND SEX DISCRIMINATION

Instead of following a separate basis model, some courts
have adopted a hybrid approach to analyze dual claims of age
and sex discrimination.276 In contrast to a separate basis approach, a hybrid approach considers how the evidence of one
type of discrimination, such as age bias, supports an inference
that another type of discrimination, such as sex bias exists.277
Under this approach, courts consider the evidence of other
types of discrimination as demonstrative of a workplace that is
generally infected or tainted with impermissible bias.278
A
hybrid
approach
provides
flexibility
and
comprehensiveness with regard to hybrid claims of sex and age
discrimination because it considers the ways in which the evidence of discrimination overlaps, instead of using an either/or
approach. Thus, courts can see the larger context of the dis276. See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2 at 21. See Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1416 (holding
that racial slurs directed at Black female employees that were tainted with sex discrimination sufficient to create a sexually discriminatory environment); Spanier v.
Morrison's Management Servs., 822 F.2d 975 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that sexist
statements by plaintifl's supervisor supported its fmdings of age discrimination); Hoth
v. Grinnell College, 23 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 528 (S.D. Iowa 1980) (holding that
although the plaintiff was not yet forty and thus not entitled to the protections under
the ADEA, her age discrimination allegations were too closely tied with her claims
under other anti-discrimination laws to dismiss).
277. See WLDF STUDY, supra note 2, at 16.
278. See id. at 21.
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crimination claims by considering the evidence for analysis in
light of all of the claims presented. A hybrid approach is particularly appropriate when the evidence of discrimination is
equally compelling and applicable to both claims, in which
case, the evidence should not be mechanically allocated to only
one claim or the other. The decisions in Sischo-Nownejad v.
Merced Community College Dist.,279 Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 280
and Hicks v. Gates Rubber CO. 281 illustrate a hybrid approach
and how plaintiffs can prevail in cases where courts adopt this
approach.
In Sischo-Nownejad, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reconsidered the grant of a summary judgment motion for
defendant, Merced Community College District ("Merced") in
which the district court determined that plaintiff failed to establish a case of intentional discrimination.282 At the time the
action arose, the plaintiff, Edina Sischo-Nownejad, was fiftyeight years old.283 Sischo-Nownejad's employment as an art
instructor at Merced commenced in 1968.284 The plaintiff al~
leged sex and age discrimination consisting of a series of established practices followed by the college for all faculty members
except Sischo-Nownejad.285 Such practices included failing to
consult with Sischo-Nownejad about the courses she wished to
teach, reassigning classes to others that Sischo-Nownejad developed and taught for years, and giving her undesirable
teaching assignments. 286 Moreover, the college failed to consult
with Sischo-Nownejad about her need for supplies and did not
to provide her with any supplies from 1982 to 1988, while it
provided supplies for all other faculty members during this pe279. 934 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1991).
280. 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985).
281. 833 F.2d 1406 (lOth Cir. 1987).
282. Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1106-07. The claims on appeal included sex and
age discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA, equal protection violations, under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and sex and age discrimination in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act. See id. at 1108.
283. See id. at 1106.
284. See id. at 1107.
285. See id. at 1106-07.
286. See Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1107. The college ordinarily based its assignments and scheduling classes on faculty member input. The senior faculty is normally given the fIrst chance to teach classes they have developed or taught for long
periods of time. See id.
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riod. 287 The enrollment in Sischo-Nownejad's courses was constantly monitored, although enrollment of classes taught by
other instructors was not. 288 When Sischo-Nownejad complained about course assignments, the college did not take action to facilitate her request. 289 On the other hand, while conducting investigations into allegations of misconduct by SischoNownejad, the ethics committee violated its own policies.290
The school repeatedly criticized Sischo-Nownejad by alleging that she failed to fulfill her required office hours under her
contract, rarely attended division meetings, and was absent
from her scheduled office hours. 291 The college also denied Sischo-Nownejad's request for leave.292 Sischo-Nownejad requested reconsideration of this decsion. 293 The college failed to
respond and after seven months, she withdrew her request for
reconsideration. 294 Sischo-Nownejad's proof also included
statements from her department chairs that indicated age and
sex bias.295 The statements included references to SischoNownejad as an "old warhorse", "a women's libber", and repeated characterizations of her students as "little old ladies
[who] have their own art studio. Wl96 Finally, Sischo-Nownejad

287.
288.
289.
290.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See Sisclw·Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1107. After Sischo-Nownejad made a verbal

complaint to the dean of the college about her course assignments being unilaterally
taken over by the division head of the art department, she submitted a written complaint to the dean and sent a copy of the letter to the president of the college and the
board of trustees. The art department head responded by filing an ethics complaint
against Sischo-Nownejad, alleging that Sischo-Nownejad charged him with unprofessional conduct by her actions, in distributing the letter to the president and board of
trustees, in violation of the established procedures for lodging such complaints. The
department head also charged that Sischo-Nownejad violated art department procedures by copying and selling art department works, as well as physically abusing another instructor. In response, the ethics committee, in violation of established policy,
conducted an investigation of the charges in open senate, rather than closed committee,
and formally reprimanded Sischo-Nownejad in a letter included in her personnel file.
See id.
291. See Sischo·Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1107. Sischo-Nownejad denied each allegation as untrue. See id.

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

See id.
See id. at 1107-08.
[d. at 1108.

See Sisclw·Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1108, 1112.
See id. at 1108.
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presented two letters from the president of the college and a
statement from the dean of personnel urging Sischo-Nownejad
to retire. 297
The Ninth Circuit analyzed the evidence of discrimination
under Title VII and the ADEA simultaneously?98 In reviewing
the facts, the Ninth Circuit relied on Lowe v. City of Monrovia
("Lowe").299
In Lowe, a black woman applied for a position with the
Monrovia police department.3OO The personnel manager responded that the department had "no black or women officers"
and therefore, had "no facilities" in which to serve her.30l
Lowe's initial complaint alleged both race and sex discrimination but the district court dismissed the sex claim because it
was time barred.302 The district court concluded that the personnel manager's statement did not raise an inference of race
discrimination sufficient to survive summary judgment.303 On
review, however, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the statement, taken in conjunction with the fact that Monrovia did not
employ black police officers, created an inference of race discrimination sufficient to establish a prima facie case.304 The
Ninth Circuit did not explicitly address the overlaps in the evidence of race and sex bias apparent in the statement by the
personnel manager. The Ninth Circuit recognized, however,

297. See id.
298. See id. at 1109-12.
299. 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985).

300. See Lowe, 775 F.2d at 1002.
301. See id. The personnel manager suggested that Lowe seek a position with the
Los Angeles Police Department where they were "begging for women and minorities."
[d. at 1002-03
302. See id. at 1003. The district court ruled that Lowe's sex claim was time barred
because Lowe failed to allege sex discrimination in her amended EEOC complaint. See
id.
303. See Lowe, 775 F.2d. at 1003. Presumably, the lower court attributed the Mfa_
cilities comment" to Lowe's sex, rather than her race.
304. See id. at 1007. Had Lowe's sex discrimination claim survived summary
judgment, it is reasonable to assume that the Ninth Circuit would have applied the
same reasoning because the department also had no women officers and the personnel
manager's statement implicated Lowe's status as a woman and an African-American.
Moreover, the question of whether or not the statement should be attributed to her sex,
race, or a hybrid of both, is not an appropriate consideration for summary judgment
because it potentially involves a disputed question of fact.
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that the comment could have applied equally to Lowe's claim of
race or sex biases and applied the statement accordingly to the
remaining race claim.305
The Ninth Circuit followed the Lowe approach to analyze
Sischo-Nownejad's case. The Ninth Circuit recognized that
Sischo-Nownejad's evidence could be attributed to her status
both as an older employee and as a woman.306 In reversing the
district court, the Ninth Circuit held that the statements that
Sischo-Nownejad was an "old warhorse", "women's libber", and
the repeated references to Sischo-Nownejad and her students
as "little old ladies", in conjunction with the overall treatment
she received, supported both the age and sex claims.307 Accordingly the Ninth Circuit remanded the case for trial on Sischo-Nownejad's age and sex discrimination claims.3°S
Similarly, in Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., a race and sex discrimination case brought by an African-American woman, the
Tenth Circuit recognized that the evidence of race and sex discrimination against plaintiff could be aggregated for analysis in
order to demonstrate a violation of Title VII. 309 The plaintiff,
Marguerite Hicks, worked for Gates Rubber Company ("Gates")
as a security guard for less than a year.3lO Hicks was the only
305. See id. at 1009. In concluding that Lowe's evidence was sufficient to meet the
prima facie burden of establishing race discrimination, the Lowe court stated:
According to plaintiffs sworn affidavit, Logans, the Personnel Division
Manager for the City made a point of telling Lowe that the Monrovia
police force had no women and no Blacks. Logans then encouraged
Lowe to apply for a position as a police officer in Los Angeles rather
than Monrovia. Logans explained that Lowe should do so because the
Los Angeles police force was "literally begging for minorities and especially females." One clear inference that could reasonably be drawn
from this statement is that the Monrovia police force was not begging
for-or even interested in-such applicants. (emphasis added).
1d. at 1009.
306. See Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1111-12.
307. 1d. at 1112.
308. See id. at 1114.
309. See 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (lOth Cir. 1987). The Appellate Court explained that
aggregation was permissible because "Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual because of race or because of sex." 1d. The Hicks court
then cited Jeffries, 615 F.2d, at 1032, wherein the Jeffries court explained that "the use
of the word 'or' evidences Congress' intent to prohibit employment discrimination based
on any or all of the listed characteristics," in arguing that aggregation of the evidence
to determine if race and sex bias existed is possible. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1416.
310. See id. at 1408.
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African-American woman employed by Gates and one of only
two African-American employees.3ll
During Hicks' employment, she complained that improper
racial and sexual remarks and conduct created a hostile environment. 312 Supervisory and regular personnel made racial
remarks referring to African-Americans as "niggers," and
"coons.,,313 Coworkers also referred to Hicks as a "lazy nigger"
and "Buffalo Butt. »314 The unwelcome sexual conduct involved
a supervisor rubbing Hicks' thigh and grabbing her breast
while jumping on top of her.315 The district court held that
Hicks' claims did not establish a hostile environment based
upon her race.31S
Although the Tenth Circuit sustained the lower court's
findings that Gates did not create a hostile environment for
black employees, it nevertheless concluded that the evidence of
racial harassment could be combined with the evidence of sex
bias to determine whether a sexual harassment hostile environment existed.317 The court relied on the reasoning in Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n which held that
a black female could establish sex and race bias in the absence
of discriminatory treatment against black males or white females. 318 The Hicks court then remanded the case to the lower
court for consideration of Hicks' sexual harassment hostile environment claim.319
Sischo-Nownejad, Lowe, and Hicks demonstrate the benefits
to plaintiffs when courts use a hybrid approach to analyze the
evidence of discrimination in cases containing the potential
that more than one type of discrimination is involved in the
claim. Moreover, a hybrid approach allows courts to consider
311. See id. at 1408-09.
312. See id. at 1409-11.
313. See id. at 1409.
314. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1409.
315. See id. at 1409-10.
316. See id. at 1411.
317. Seeid. at 1416-17. For a discussion of sexual harassment hostile environment,
see supra notes 92-95 accompanying text.
318. See Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1416, citing Jeffries, 615 F.2d, at 1032.
319. See Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1419.
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the ways in which the plaintiffs complete identity factors into
the treatment she receives. A hybrid approach encourages
greater scrutiny by courts of the overlaps in the evidence of sex
and age discrimination as indicative of multi-factor, rather
than single factor discrimination. This approach may increase
a plaintiffs chances of prevailing when hybrid discrimination is
present.
B. COURTS AND ATTORNEYS MUST USE A COMPREHENSIVE
MODEL TO AssESS HYBRID AGE AND SEX DISCRIMINATION

This comment discussed several obvious ways to address the
problems of hybrid discrimination. The first step begins with
attorneys who handle hybrid discrimination cases. Attorneys
must consider and investigate whether an older woman's
status as an "older woman", rather than just her age or sex,
played a part in the treatment she experienced. Next, attorneys should plead both sex and age discrimination whenever
the facts suggest the possibility that a hybrid of both age and
sex exists, rather than take an either/or approach to pleading
these claims. Moreover, lawyers should adopt the "sex-plus"
pleading model under Title VII, in addition to alleging age discrimination under the ADEA, whenever an older woman's
status as an "older woman" contributes to the discrimination
she experiences. This pleading posture focuses a court's attention on the evidence of discrimination directed at older women,
absent general age and sex discrimination. However, because
all courts have not yet accepted older women as a protected
subclass under Title VII, a separate allegation of age discrimination is still necessary in order to avoid the possibility of multiple summary adjudication discussed in Arnett.320
Finally, courts should adopt a hybrid approach to analyze
sex and age discrimination claims, whenever the evidence of
discrimination suggests a hybrid. A hybrid approach is neces-

320. See Arnett, 846 F. Supp. at 1238; see also supra notes 130-46. See also Mur·
dock, 1992 WL 393158 at *3; see also supra notes 125-28, wherein the State Appellate
Court refused to consider the evidence of combined age and sex discrimination directed
at older women and accordingly held that no evidence of pure age or sex discrimination
was presented.
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sary in these cases because it allows a court to consider how
the proof of discrimination directed at an older woman supports both the sex and age discrimination allegations.
VII. CONCLUSION
Lawyers and judges faced with hybrid age and sex claims
must consider the particular issues that arise in these claims
by older women. Alternative analytical models, such as "sexplus" and "hybrid approach analysis" are necessary to effectively resolve hybrid discrimination claims. There are challenges inherent in the next century where older women will
become an expanded group of older employees and potential
litigants under both Title VII and the ADEA for hybrid claims
of discrimination. The reality requires the development of a
comprehensive approach to the problem of hybrid discrimination. This comment provides but a starting point for that development.
Sabina F. Crocette*
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